Let Sleeping Regs Lie: A Diatribe on Regulation A’s Futility Before and After the J.O.B.S. Act by Newman, Neal
ARTICLE 2 NEWMAN TO PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/15 1:25 PM 
 
 
65 
 
LET SLEEPING REGS LIE: A DIATRIBE ON 
REGULATION A’S FUTILITY BEFORE AND AFTER 
THE J.O.B.S. ACT 
 
Neal Newman* 
Did Congress do the right thing when it attempted to revise Regulation 
A through Title IV of the J.O.B.S. Act or was their legislative effort an 
exercise in futility? 
On April 4 2012, President Obama signed into law the J.O.B.S.  
(Jumpstart Our Business Startups) Act.  The Act’s intent is to ease the 
regulatory burden on smaller companies when issuing securities in both 
private and public offerings.  This paper’s specific focus is on the Act’s 
Title IV.  Title IV makes revisions to Regulation A, a private securities 
offering exemption promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933. 
A big problem with Regulation A historically is that the provisions 
were burdensome, costly, and time consuming.  In addition to a Federal 
component that required the issuer to file an offering statement with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation A also requires that the 
issuer meet filing requirements within each state jurisdiction in which the 
issuer planned on offering its securities.1  The heavy compliance burden 
was coupled with the fact that the most you could raise through a 
Regulation A offering was $5 million.2  As a result, Regulation A has 
historically been all but dormant in use.3 
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Yohana Mantrana and Alesya Vasilenko for their valuable research and help in getting to the finished 
product.  Also thanks to Texas A&M University School of Law for supporting my work though 
the provision of a summer research grant. 
 1. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012) (exempting under Section 18 of the Securities 
Act of 1933 certain securities and securities offerings from state registration, but not 
exempting offerings made under Regulation A (pre-J.O.B.S. Act)). 
 2. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (pre-J.O.B.S. Act) amended by 17 C.F.R. pt. 230 
(2015). 
 3. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 9, Figure 1.  
The Report conveys Regulation A’s declining use which peaked at 116 filings in 1997 and 
has declined steadily through 2011 where there were only 19 Regulation A filings in 2011.  
ARTICLE 2 (NEWMAN) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/15  1:25 PM 
66 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:1 
 
 
The J.O.B.S. Act’s Title IV has sought to remedy this by making 
several changes to Regulation A; the most noteworthy of which involves 
raising the offering ceiling from $5 million to $50 million.  The question 
then is will this be enough to offset the compliance burdens that historically 
have kept issuers from using Regulation A.  This paper takes a critical look 
at the changes to Regulation A mandated under the J.O.B.S. Act and 
concludes that Congress missed the mark yet again with its Regulation A 
revisions. 
Congress should have left Regulation A alone as a poorly conceived 
regulation that was flawed at its initial inception.  Not quite an exposé, this 
paper calls to task Congress’ legislative thought process in the area of 
securities offering exemptions and seeks to hold them accountable for 
creating a revised offering exemption without regard for its potential end 
users. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Though the law is a learned profession steeped in the art of problem 
solving, in some instances, the solution is simply to leave it alone as hard 
as that may be for us to accept.  And that’s okay.  Accepting this reality 
frees us to deal with other endeavors more worthy of our time. 
On April 8, 2014, Luis A. Aguilar, one of the five appointed Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioners, stood before an 
audience of anxious state securities regulators and used all the tact and 
diplomacy that he could bring to bear to ease their concerns regarding the 
Commission’s proposed rulemaking changes to the private securities 
exemption known as Regulation A.  The proposed rules then being 
considered would greatly reduce the state regulator’s role in overseeing 
Regulation A offerings in their respective jurisdictions.4 
In a similar reaction to the Commission’s proposed rulemaking, on 
June 3, 2014, a group of 20 House Democrats signed a letter written to 
SEC Chairman Mary Jo White stating that the SEC’s proposed “Regulation 
A Plus” rules preempt state law too broadly, contrary to Congress’ intent.5  
Finally, the North American Securities Administrators Association 
(NASAA) sent a strongly worded letter to the Commission, attacking the 
 
 4. Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm’r, Comments at the North American Securities 
Administrators Association Annual NASAA/SEC 19(d) Conference in Washington D.C. 
(Apr. 8, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370541436767#.VMpWgxfnbcs, 
archived at http://perma.cc/52BB-69XW. 
 5. Letter from Stephen F. Lynch et al., Members of Cong., to Honorable Mary Jo 
White, Chair, SEC (June 3, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-
114.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/P9AD-C2MZ. 
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proposed changes to Regulation A on many fronts and questioning the 
proposed rules’ legality.6  What started as a bid to make Regulation A a 
more user friendly7 private placement exemption for issuers has 
mushroomed into a quagmire that has done nothing but reveal the flaws 
that existed before Regulation A was modified and that still remain after its 
revisions. 
At times lawmakers get off track because they fail to ask the right 
question.  During senate hearings on Regulation A and other capital 
formation issues, Senator Shelby asked, “[A]re there any changes that 
could be made to make Regulation A more appealing . . . ?”8  But the more 
pointed question should have been, “Does Regulation A fill any unmet 
need or purpose in the realm of private securities offerings?”  If Congress 
would have explored the situation by asking the appropriate threshold 
question, their whole approach to Regulation A may have taken a 
completely different path.  Instead, Congress has engaged in a futile effort 
to revive Regulation A with legislative action through Title IV of the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (J.O.B.S.) Act.9 
Congress’ effort to revive Regulation A was an ill-conceived endeavor 
that never should have occurred.  Congress should have accepted the fact 
that Regulation A is a private placement option that has moved to near 
extinction for two reasons:  1) Regulation A at its inception was too 
cumbersome, too time-consuming, and too costly to be a viable option for 
most issuers, where the maximum amount of money an issuer could raise in 
 
 6. See Comment Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., 
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-
13/s71113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-NP9J. (questioning the Commission’s 
authority to define key terms, arguing for state-run alternatives to the proposed regime, and 
providing additional cost-benefit analysis to highlight problems with the proposed regime). 
 7. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors—Part 
I: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 25-26 
(2011) (inquiry from Sen. Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous., & 
Urban Affairs), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg74738/html/CHRG-
112shrg74738.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2G6S-JMU6. 
 8. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors—Part 
I: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 25-26 
(2011) (inquiry from Sen. Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous., & 
Urban Affairs), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg74738/html/CHRG-
112shrg74738.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2G6S-JMU6. 
 9. See generally Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (J.O.B.S. Act), Pub. L. No. 112-
106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-
112hr3606enr.pdf?n=07083, archived at http://perma.cc/D7D2-VG8W; see also Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups Act tit. IV (“Small Company Capital Formation”). 
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any twelve month period was $5 million;10 and 2) a closer look at the few 
issuers who decided to go the Regulation A route reveal that their filings 
could have been achieved under a less costly, less cumbersome exemption 
if they had given the threshold decision of which exemption might be best a 
bit more thought.11  This paper delves into this matter to reveal the 
conclusion that Congress should have come to on its own had they asked 
the right questions.  No attempt should have been made to revive 
Regulation A’s use.  Regulation A was a flawed and ill-conceived 
exemption at its inception and should have been left to extinction.  This 
paper will lay out the reasons for this conclusion. 
The paper is organized as follows:  Section I provides foundational 
knowledge regarding the J.O.B.S. Act in general and Title IV, the provision 
that revises Regulation A, in particular.  Section II discusses the 
cumbersome aspects of Regulation A to bolster the reasons for Regulation 
A’s historical lack of use.  Section III supplies actual data showing 
Regulation A’s use, or lack thereof, compared to other private offering 
exemptions that are less expensive, less time-consuming, and less 
cumbersome for the issuer.  Section IV then explains the modifications the 
J.O.B.S. Act has made to Regulation A, the most notable of which is 
raising Regulation A’s offering cap from $5 million to $50 million.  There 
are other revisions as well, some of which have been and remain the basis 
of controversy and debate as of this article’s publication date.  The 
revisions and controversies surrounding some of the proposed changes will 
be discussed in Section IV as well.  Section V posits the question of 
whether the modifications to Regulation A as promulgated under the 
J.O.B.S. Act will manifest itself in the form of issuers selecting Regulation 
A with more frequency compared to historical numbers.  Section V takes 
the position that Regulation A as modified will not result in issuers 
selecting Regulation A with any greater frequency and explains the reasons 
for this conclusion.  Section VI explains one of the more controversial 
aspects of Regulation A:  namely the SEC’s final rules which preempt 
Regulation A filings from all state registration and filing requirements for 
offerings exceeding $20 million.  The intent is to explain the controversy 
surrounding this significant change to Regulation A and tie it into the 
overall argument as to why Regulation A’s cumbersome aspects far 
outweigh any benefits that might be derived from using the exemption.  
Section VII suggests changes that could be made to Regulation A that 
 
 10. Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (amended by 17 C.F.R. § 
230.251(b) (2015)). 
 11. See discussion infra Part IV (arguing that exemptions issued under Regulation A are 
rare and have been improperly assigned).  
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might give it a better chance at being a viable offering exemption.  Finally, 
Section VIII concludes. 
I. THE J.O.B.S. ACT AND REGULATION A 
A. The J.O.B.S. Act in General 
On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed into law the Jumpstart Our 
Business Startups (J.O.B.S.) Act.12  The Act’s intended purpose is to ease 
the regulatory burden on small businesses when going public and operating 
as publicly held companies.13  The Act consists of seven titles.14  This 
article focuses on the Act’s Title IV – Small Company Capital Formation.  
Title IV undertakes the noble but questionable endeavor of revising a 
flawed and seldom-used securities offering exemption with the hope of 
making the exemption a more viable and appealing option for issuers 
seeking a private placement exemption.15  The exemption in question is 
referred to as Regulation A.16  Prior to the proposed revisions under the 
J.O.B.S. Act, Regulation A allowed those filing under its exemption to 
offer up to $5 million worth of equity shares without having to register 
them.17 
But Regulation A historically has not been used very much and over 
 
 12. Mark Landler, Obama Signs Bill to Promote Start-Up Investments, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 5, 2012, at A12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/us/politics/obama-signs-bill-to-
ease-investing-in-start-ups.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print, archived at 
https://perma.cc/W5AT-P6V2. 
 13. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors—
Part I: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 1 
(2011) (opening statement of Sen. Tim Johnson, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., & 
Urban Affairs), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg74738/html/CHRG-
112shrg74738.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2G6S-JMU6 (“We are here to discuss how 
to help startups and businesses get access to the capital they need to grow and to create new 
jobs, while protecting investors.”).   
 14. See J.O.B.S. Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, § 2 (2012), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-
112hr3606enr.pdf?n=07083, archived at http://perma.cc/D7D2-VG8W (listing the seven 
titles in the table of contents). 
 15. See Shelby supra n. 8 at 25-26. (during the hearing, Senator Shelby noted when 
speaking to Meredith Cross, Director, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and 
Exchange Commission, “As you noted in your testimony, last year [2010] only three 
Regulation A filings were qualified by the SEC.  So far this year not a single Regulation A 
filing has been cleared”).   
 16. Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251–.263 (2015).  
 17. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (pre-J.O.B.S. Act) (amended by 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b)) 
(2015). 
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time has become close to dormant as companies have sought other less 
cumbersome exemptions that allow them to raise more money in less time 
and at a fraction of the cost.18  In response to Regulation A’s historical lack 
of use, Congress has made revisions to Regulation A through the J.O.B.S. 
Act’s Title IV with the intent of making Regulation A a more appealing 
and viable option.  Under these revisions, Regulation A is now referred to 
as Regulation A+.19 
This paper critiques this endeavor and questions both the wisdom and 
necessity of doing so.  Regulation A was a flawed exemption at its 
inception.  With its Regulation A revival, the J.O.B.S. Act has only 
succeeded in sparking debate from regulators and politicians, neither of 
whom have likely taken the time to critically assess the situation.  If they 
had, they would have come to the same conclusion:  let a sleeping 
regulation lie.  Regulation A was well on its way to extinction.  As will be 
discussed later in this paper, there was only one qualified Regulation A 
offering in 2011.  This is compared to 8,194 Regulation D offerings where 
the offering size was $5 million or less.20  Congress should have left 
Regulation A alone and let it continue to be phased out of use altogether. 
B. Title IV – Small Company Capital Formation 
As mentioned earlier, Title IV revises Regulation A with the intent of 
making it more appealing to issuers.21  The most significant Regulation A 
modification was the increased cap on its offering size.  The J.O.B.S. Act 
raised the Regulation A offering limit from $5 million to $50 million.22  
Additionally, Title IV has enacted counteracting modifications to offset the 
 
 18. For example, Rule 506 of Regulation D is the most often used Private offering 
exemption for reasons that will be explained later in this paper.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).  
See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 10-11 (Report 
details how issuers choose Regulation D’s Rule 506 with much more frequency than 
Regulation A). 
 19. Samuel S. Guzik, Regulation A+: A Sleeping Giant For Small Business Capital 
Formation?, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2014, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/04/37035-regulation-sleeping-giant-small-business-
capital-formation/, archived at http://perma.cc/CDY9-3PJZ. 
 20. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 11. 
 21. See Shelby, supra note 8, at 25-26. 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(A) (2012) (“The aggregate offering amount of all securities 
offered and sold within the prior 12-month period in reliance on the exemption added in 
accordance with this paragraph shall not exceed $50,000,000.”). 
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increased exposure to investors as a result of raising its cap.23  The 
problems with this and the futility of these modifications will also be 
discussed in depth throughout the remainder of this article. 
II. REGULATION A’S CUMBERSOME ASPECTS – (PRE J.O.B.S. 
ACT) 
Historically, Regulation A was not used frequently.  From a 
compliance standpoint, Regulation A was cumbersome and the most you 
could raise through the offering was $5 million.  Those aspects made 
Regulation A an exemption with little appeal.24  A discussion of those 
cumbersome Regulation A aspects follows. 
A. The Federal Component 
An issuer wishing to file under Regulation A must first file an offering 
statement referred to as a Form 1-A.25  This form consists of thirty-five 
pages of requested information, including business information, financial 
information, risk factors, use of proceeds, principal stockholders, etc.26  
Securities professionals often compared the Form 1-A disclosures to a full-
blown registration statement.27  The required disclosures are very similar in 
terms of the breadth and depth of required information.  Once all the 
required disclosures have been provided, a well prepared Form 1-A 
requires twenty-five to thirty-five pages of disclosed information.28  Even 
 
 23. For example, where the issuer’s offering size exceeds $20 million, the issuer must 
include audited financial statements in the offering circular Regulation A Offering 
Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, Form 1-A. 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015).  See 17 
C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (2015)(prescribing the informational filing and disclosure requirements 
for Regulation A offerings); 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (requiring the use of Form 1-A for 
Regulation A offerings); S.E.C., Form 1-A — Regulation A Offering Statement Under the 
Securities Act of 1933, pt. F/S(c), https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-a.pdf, archived 
at https://perma.cc/H6QP-GU3Q (requiring audited financial statements for Tier 2 
Regulation A offerings). 
 24. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 11 (showing 
the number of Regulation A filings compared to other exemptions). 
 25. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i) (2014), amended by 17 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2015).  
 26. SEC, Form 1-ASEC33, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-a.pdf, archived at 
https://perma.cc/H6QP-GU3Q. 
 27.  In drawing upon the author’s own experiences as a practitioner spanning from 
1998-2003, I never considered Regulation A as a viable option for my clients based in large 
part on the significant amount of time and expense that would be required to complete the 
Form–1A Offering Statement.  
 28. See, e.g., Lightspeed Sys., Inc., Regulation A Offering Statement Under the 
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though Regulation A technically does not require registration, the issuer 
must file the Form 1-A with the SEC where it will go through a 
qualification process.29  An SEC examiner reviews the document to make 
sure the disclosures have comported with the Form 1-A’s disclosure 
requirements.  When the examiner is satisfied, then the SEC will qualify 
the offering.30 
According to a General Accountant’s Office (GAO) study, the 
Regulation A qualification process took an average of 228 days,31 almost 
two-thirds of a year.  The GAO report (Report) did not offer any 
explanations as to why the qualification process took so long to complete, 
but after reviewing over forty Regulation A filings, a plausible answer was 
evident.  Many of the Regulation A filings sampled were prepared without 
counsel’s assistance.  This conclusion was based on the fact that these 
filings were either hand written or written in such a way that it was clear 
the offering was not drafted by an attorney.  Much of the Form 1-A’s 
required disclosures were either inadequate or non-existent in the offering 
statements that were reviewed.  Thus, the likely reason for the extended 
timeline to qualification was the considerable back and forth between the 
Commission and the filer to ensure that the filer complied with all of the 
Form 1-A mandates.  Accordingly, if an issuer took the additional steps of 
hiring accountants and lawyers to assist in preparing the offering statement, 
this would add considerable expense to a filing process that again, at the 
most, would yield gross proceeds of $5 million.32 
B. The State Component 
In addition to the cumbersome federal component just described, 
Regulation A has a state registration component as well.33  Layering the 
 
Securities Act of 1933 (Form 1-A) (June 30, 2008),  
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/08/9999999997-08-030442, archived at 
http://perma.cc/UY3B-7D6C (example of a Form 1-A that contained 121 pages of 
disclosure filed in 2008 by a company called Lightspeed Systems, Inc.). 
 29. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 11-12 
(providing a detailed description of qualification process). 
 30. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(g) (2015). 
 31. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS, supra note 29, at 12 
(according to SEC data obtained covering the periods from 2002–2011).  
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (pre-J.O.B.S. Act) amended by 17 C.F.R. pt. 230 
(2015). 
 33. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012) (exempting under Section 18 of the Securities 
Act of 1933 certain securities and securities offerings from state registration, but not 
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state components on top of an already burdensome federal qualification 
process makes for a regime that has caused many issuers to turn to other 
options.  Under the state registration component, the issuer has to register 
in each state that the issuer is considering offering its securities.34  The 
difficulty here is that each state has its own and often varied registration 
requirements.35  To properly register an offering, the issuer has to make 
sure it complies with the registration process for each state.36 
To conform, the issuer has to research the registration requirements in 
each jurisdiction.37  Adding to the difficulty, each jurisdiction has different 
filing requirements.38  Some states merely have a “disclosure” review 
where the issuer simply comports with the disclosure requirements in that 
jurisdiction.39  But some states also have a “merit review” where the state 
regulator not only reviews the issuer for adequate disclosure but also makes 
a merit assessment.40  These merit reviews take such forms as not passing 
on the filing if the issuer does not show positive earnings within the three 
years preceding the offering.41  The combined weight of the cumbersome 
federal qualification requirement and the numerous state registration 
requirements is more than enough to push Regulation A down and 
ultimately off the list of exempt transaction possibilities. 
III. REGULATION A AND ITS LACK OF HISTORICAL USE 
Due to all that historically was involved with a Regulation A filing, 
Regulation A has gone from an exemption that was used sparingly in the 
early ‘90’s to one that today is close to dormant in relative terms.  For 
example, in 1992 there were only 20 Regulation A filings, of which all 20 
were qualified.42  Regulation A filings peaked around 1997 when issuers 
 
exempting offerings made under Regulation A (pre-J.O.B.S. Act)).   
 34. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS, supra note 29, at 13. 
 35. Id. at 13.  
 36. See id. at 13-14 (describing the two general methods for registering securities 
offerings in specific states). 
 37. But cf. id. at 13-19 (pointing out that state regulators are putting forth the effort to 
streamline the process).   
 38. See id. at 13-14 (describing the two general methods for registering securities 
offerings in specific states). 
 39. Id. at 13. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 14. 
 42. See id. at 9, fig. 1 (showing the number of Regulation A filings between 1992 and 
2011 and the Regulation A offerings that were actually qualified during that same period). 
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filed 116 Regulation A offering circulars.43  But of the 116 filings, only 56 
(roughly half) actually worked their way through the Commission’s review 
process and obtained qualification.44  By 2011, the Regulation A filing 
number dwindled to nineteen with the Commission only qualifying one of 
those nineteen Regulation A filings;45 numbers never lie.  Regulation A 
with its comprehensive offering circular, coupled with its state filing 
requirements, presented an option that was cumbersome, time-consuming, 
and costly and therefore was regularly passed over for other more 
appealing options. 
A. Comparing Regulation A’s Use with Other Exemptions 
In making the argument for the J.O.B.S. Act’s futility in revising 
Regulation A, it is enlightening to look at the other available private 
exemption options to appreciate what makes the other choices preferable.  
In the GAO study mentioned earlier, the GAO compared Regulation A’s 
use with other potential exempt offerings.  The GAO’s results were 
revealing.  The report looked at the period covering the years 2008-2011 
and compared Regulation A with Regulation D’s Rule 506.46  Regulation 
D’s Rule 506 is another exempt offering available under the Securities Act 
which allows issuers to offer securities to private investors without having 
to register those securities.47  Under Regulation D’s Rule 506, the issuer 
can transact an exempt offering with no dollar limit.48  But the investors 
must either be accredited or have a threshold level of financial 
sophistication to participate in the offering.49  Also, the rule requires that 
financial disclosures be made to those investors who are not accredited 
investors.50  Further (and stated with emphasis), Rule 506 is exempt from 
 
 43. See id. at 5-6 (noting that although the issuer that relies on Regulation A is not 
required to register the securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the issuer 
still must file its Regulation A offering circular with the Commission for review and 
approval); see id. at 6 (noting that once the offering has been approved it is deemed to be 
“Qualified.”).  
 44. Id. at 8. 
 45. See id., at 9, fig.1 (showing the number of Regulation A filings between 1992 and 
2011 and the Regulation A offerings that were actually qualified during that same period). 
 46. Id. at 10-11. 
 47. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015) (providing exemption for limited offers and sales 
without regard to the dollar amount as along as all the other criteria are met, there is no 
offering limit). 
 48. Id.   
 49. Id. at § 230.506 (b)(2), (c)(2). 
 50. See id. at (b)(1)(stating that the issuer must satisfy the terms and conditions of 
section 230.501 and section 230.502).  Rule 502(b) specifies the financial disclosures that 
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all state filing and registration requirements.51  The exemption from the 
state filing requirements is granted explicitly through Section 18(b)(4)(D) 
of the Securities Act of 1933.52  Rule 506 is being used for comparison 
because it was by far the predominate choice for private placement 
offerings.53  The numbers by comparison were staggering. 
The GAO Report did not obtain Regulation D numbers for 2008 and 
2009.  But during those two years, the number of Regulation A offerings 
that were QUALIFIED were eight and three respectively.54  In 2010 there 
were six qualified Regulation A offerings.55  By comparison, in 2010 there 
were a total of 7,517 exempt offerings filed under Regulation D’s Rule 
506.56  And to achieve the most meaningful comparison possible, the 
Report only included those Regulation D offerings that were for $5 million 
or less, the maximum Regulation A offering amount prior to its change to 
$50 million under the J.O.B.S. Act.57  Likewise in 2011, there was only one 
qualified Regulation A offering compared to 8,194 offerings filed under 
Regulation D’s Rule 506 for offering amounts of $5 million or less.58  Rule 
506 is vibrant and often used.  Regulation A by comparison has been 
trending downward since its peak of fifty-seven qualified offerings in 
1998.59 
 
the issuer must provide to certain investors; namely non-accredited investors.  17 C.F.R. § 
230.502(b) (2015).  Generally, the larger the offering, the more financial and non-financial 
information the issuer is required to provide to its investors.  Id. 
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012) (exempting offerings issued under section 4(a)(2) 
of the Securities Act of 1933 (codified at 17 U.S.C.§ 77d(2) (2012)).  Regulation D Rule 
506 is a Regulation issued under section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and is 
therefore exempt.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2012). 
 52. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012) (exempting offerings issued under section 
4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (codified at 17 U.S.C.§ 77d(2) (2012)).  Regulation D 
Rule 506 is a Regulation issued under section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and is 
therefore exempt.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2012). 
 53. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at 
10. 
 54. Id. at 11, tbl. 1.  
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 10, 11 tbl. 1.  
 58. Id. at 11 tbl.1.  Regulation D’s Rule 506 places no limits on the offering amount.  
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).  Therefore, the GAO Report only used the Rule 506 offerings 
that were for $5 million or less.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, 
SECURITIES REGULATION: FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS 
(2012), supra note 29, at 10, 11 tbl.1. 
 59. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at 
9 fig.1. 
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B. Why Regulation D’s Rule 506 is the Preferred Choice 
When comparing the Rule 506 requirements to Regulation A, it is 
clear why Rule 506 has been the preferred choice. 
OFFERING SIZE – Prior to the J.O.B.S. Act, Regulation A’s offering 
size was capped at $5 million;60 whereas under Rule 506, there is no 
offering size limit.61  Issuers can do an offering of any size, as long as the 
Rule 506 requirements are met.  But as highlighted earlier, issuers 
overwhelmingly chose Rule 506 over Regulation D even where the 
offering sizes were less than $5 million.62 
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS – Rule 506 has no disclosure 
requirements for offerings made to accredited investors.63  However, the 
rule does require that audited financial statements be furnished to investors 
that are not accredited.64  Where disclosure is required, the depth and 
breadth of financial disclosure required depends on the offering size.65  
Generally speaking, as the offering size gets bigger, the depth and breadth 
of financial disclosure under Rule 506 increases.66  By comparison, 
Regulation A requires the issuer to prepare and file the thirty-five page 
Form 1-A regardless of whether the investors are accredited or not.67  In 
this regard, the disclosure requirements for Rule 506 and Regulation A are 
comparable.  But the significant difference is that the Regulation A 
exemption requires the issuer to file the offering statement with the SEC 
and be subject to SEC review and qualification.68  Rule 506 merely requires 
 
 60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (specifying $5 million limit) (amended by 17 C.F.R. 
pt. 230 (2015)).  
 61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).  Whereas Rule 504 and 505 specify limits of $1 million 
and $5 million respectively, Rule 506 does not state any dollar limit.  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-
.506 (2015). 
 62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at 
11 tbl.1. 
 63. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2015) (recommending that disclosures be made to 
accredited investors to avoid running afoul of the anti-fraud provisions under both the ‘33 
and ‘34 Acts.).   
 64. Id. at §230.502(b)(1)-(2).  
 65. See id. at § 230.502(b)(2)(ii)(B)(1) (requiring an audited balance sheet dated within 
120 days from the issued date for offerings up to $2,000,000); see id. § 
230.502(b)(2)(ii)(B)(2) (requiring additional disclosures such as audited financial statements 
for a specified number of years for offerings up to $ 7,500,000).  See id. § 230.502(b) (2015) 
(listing the full complement of required disclosures).  
 66. See id. at § 230.502(b)(2)(ii)(B) (describing the disclosure requirements for 
offerings of various sizes). 
 67. Id. at § 230.252(a). 
 68. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
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that the disclosure be made directly to the potential investors.69  This 
difference is significant in that filing with the SEC results in an average 
qualification period of 228 days for a Regulation A filing; whereas under 
Rule 506 such a qualification process does not exist.70  Therefore there is 
no wait time involved under a Rule 506 offering.  The issuer can offer its 
securities immediately under a Rule 506 offering.71 
INVESTOR QUALIFICATIONS – Rule 506 has qualification criteria for its 
potential investors.  Investors must either be accredited, or 
“sophisticated.”72  By “sophisticated” the Rule states explicitly, “[e]ach 
purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his 
purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial 
and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of 
the prospective investment. . . .”73  By comparison, Regulation A has no 
qualifying criteria for its investors.  Anyone can participate in a Regulation 
A offering regardless of their net worth, income, or their financial 
sophistication.74 
At first blush, the “no investor qualification requirement” under 
Regulation A may appear to be an advantage and would add to Regulation 
A’s appeal, but a review of some forty-two Regulation A filings between 
2008 and 2014 pointed toward a contrary conclusion.75  This study revealed 
that even though the issuers were filing under Regulation A, their filing 
documents indicated either a clear preference for investors that were either 
accredited out right, or loosely met the accredited investor criteria.  Six out 
 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at 
summary page What GAO Found. 
 69. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2015) (specifying the non-financial and financial 
information to be disclosed to investors).  No SEC filing requirement is stated in the 
Regulation D except the requirement to file what is referred to as a Form D.  17 C.F.R. § 
230.502(c)(2) (2015). 
 70. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at 
12. 
 71. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502, .506 (2015).  Rule 502 does require the issuer to file what is 
called a Form D with the SEC.  17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(2) (2015).  But this is merely a 
notice filing requirements and is not subject to an SEC review or qualification process.  17 
C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(2) (2015). 
 72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2015). 
 73. Id. 
 74. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2015) (placing no stipulations on the 
investor’s qualifications and, by inference, allowing anyone to invest in a Regulation A 
offering regardless of net worth, income, or financial sophistication).   
 75. 42 Regulation A filings covering 2008-2014 were randomly selected.  Each of the 
42 filings selected are listed 1-42 in the Appendix: Part A with specific findings broken out 
into categories in Appendix: Part B. 
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of the forty-two Regulation A filings reviewed limited their pool of 
potential investors to accredited investors only.76  Additionally, ten out of 
the forty-two filings placed a minimum investment amount of $1,000 or 
more.77  Only nine out of the forty-two indicated a clear intent to solicit 
investors publicly.78  And only three out of the forty-two filings indicated 
that they were actively seeking investors without regard for the investor’s 
income, net worth, or financial sophistication.79  So, where one might 
initially think Regulation A provides advantages with its more liberal 
investor qualification criteria, as a practical matter the reality pans out quite 
differently.  The issue of investor qualifications will be explored in more 
detail later in this paper. 
C. The Onerous State Provisions 
As briefly mentioned earlier, under Regulation D’s Rule 506, the 
issuer is exempt from any State Blue Sky registration requirements.80  
Specifically, this means that the issuer can forego all state registration or 
filing requirements.  By contrast, Regulation A requires registration in each 
state where the issuer is going to be offering securities.81  This state 
component adds significant effort on the issuer’s part as the issuer must 
research each state’s individual registration requirements and then the 
issuer must tailor its filing to comport with each state. 
When looking at all that is required, it is clear why Regulation A 
historically has not been the exemption of choice; too much required for 
too little benefit.  But Congress has concluded incorrectly that if it simply 
makes some “tweaks” to Regulation A, the tweaks will make Regulation A 
a more viable option and issuers will select the Regulation A exemption 
with more frequency than what has occurred historically.82  But Regulation 
 
 76. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 1 which lists the Regulation A filers that 
limited their pool of investors to accredited investors only. 
 77. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 4 for a list of Regulation A filers stipulating at 
least a $1,000 per investor minimum. 
 78. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 6 for a list of Regulation A filers who showed 
a clear intent to solicit investor publicly. 
 79. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 7 for a list of Regulation A filers that clearly 
indicated through a low per share purchase price and no investor criteria that their offering 
was open to any interested investor. 
 80. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2012). 
 81. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at 
13. 
 82. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors—Part 
I: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 25-26 
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A was a flawed exemption from its inception and any changes to it won’t 
be enough.  The fact that there are other choices that do everything that 
Regulation A does but with much less burden makes Regulation A a “non-
starter” even with the revisions that have been proposed under the J.O.B.S. 
Act.83  Those revisions will be discussed and analyzed in the following 
section. 
IV. THE J.O.B.S. ACT’S REGULATION A MODIFICATIONS 
On March 25, 2015, after much political wrangling, the SEC, in a rare 
act of defiance against state regulators, drafted final rules to amend 
Regulation A.84  The highlights to the SEC’s final Regulation A rules are as 
follows: 
A TWO-TIERED OFFERING SYSTEM: In the SEC’s final rules, it has 
divided Regulation A offerings into two tiers:  Tier 1 and Tier 2.85  Tier 1 is 
for offerings up to $20 million.86  Tier 2 is for offerings between $20 
million and $50 million.87  The SEC’s final rules have different filing, 
reporting, and disclosure requirements for each of the two tiers. 
TIER 1 – Tier 1 relates to offerings up to $20 million.88  Under the Tier 
1 Regulation A offering regime, the issuer’s maximum offering amount can 
be up to, but may not exceed, $20 million.89  Under the Tier 1 offering 
regime, the investors need not have any special investor qualifications;90 
the investors can be both accredited and non-accredited investors and there 
is no limit as to how much any one investor can invest.91  Under the Tier 1 
 
(2011) (inquiry from Sen. Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous., & 
Urban Affairs), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg74738/html/CHRG-
112shrg74738.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2G6S-JMU6.  Legislative hearings 
testimony suggests that simply raising the dollar limit on Regulation A and making other 
modifications will fix what has been ailing the Regulation A exemption since its inception. 
 83. As discussed previously, Regulation D’s Rule 506 has no dollar limit and the issuer 
is preempted from state registration requirements.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).  See 
generally 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012) (exempting under Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 
certain securities and securities offerings from state registration, but not exempting offerings 
made under Regulation A (pre-J.O.B.S. Act)). 
 84. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21806 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 
230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260). 
 85. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2015). 
 86. Id. at § 230.251(a)(1). 
 87. Id. at § 230.251(a)(2). 
 88. Id. at § 230.251(a)(1). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. (imposing no specific requirements for the investor’s qualifications and no 
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offering regime, the issuer can widely solicit investors, and the shares come 
with no restrictions on resale.92 
Under the Tier 1 regime, the issuer will be required to complete the 
same qualification process as mentioned earlier with the filing of Form 1-
A.93  Consistent with the Regulation A requirements prior to the J.O.B.S. 
Act, the Issuer need not include audited financial statements with the 
filing.94  Likewise, the issuer will not be subject to ongoing periodic 
financial disclosures or reporting requirements.95  Under the Tier 1 offering 
regime, the issuer will remain subject to state filing and registration 
requirements.96  In sum, all Tier 1 offerings will be subject to the same 
requirements that were in place prior to the J.O.B.S. Act.  No changes were 
made to the previous Regulation A provisions other than raising the cap 
from $5 million to $20 million.97 
TIER 2 — Under the Tier 2 Regulation A offering regime, the issuer 
can offer securities for amounts between $20 million and $50 million.98  
Similar to Tier 1 investors, Tier 2 investors need not have any special 
investor qualifications.99  But, non-accredited investors may not invest 
more than 10% of either their annual gross income or 10% of their net 
worth, whichever is greater.100  Again, similar to Tier 1, Tier 2 issuers can 
advertise for and solicit investors.101 
The filing and reporting requirements, however, are much more 
stringent for Tier 2 issuers.  Under Tier 2, the issuer must include audited 
financial statements with its Form 1-A offering statement.102  Additionally, 
 
limits on the amounts of investments). 
 92. Id. at § 230.255(a). 
 93. Id. at § 230.252(a). 
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at § 230.257(a). 
 96. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2012) (comparing Section 15 to Section 18 to show that 
Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 generally does not exempt Regulation A offerings 
from state registration and filing requirements).   
 97. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015), with 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2014) (as amended by 17 
C.F.R pt. 230 (2015)) (showing no changes other than the raising of the cap). 
 98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2015). 
 99. See id. (containing no requirements for special investor qualifications). 
 100. Id. at § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C). 
 101. Id. at § 230.255. 
 102. Regulation A Offering Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, Form 1-A, 17 
C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015) prescribes the informational filing and disclosure requirements for 
Regulation A offerings.  17 C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (2015).  See 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (requiring 
the use of Form 1-A for Regulation A offerings); S.E.C., Form 1-A — Regulation A 
Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, pt. F/S(c), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-a.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H6QP-GU3Q 
(requiring audited financial statements for Tier 2 Regulation A offerings). 
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the issuer must prepare and file annual, semi-annual, and current financial 
reports with the SEC.103  These reports must include audited financial 
statements.104  There is an important caveat to the ongoing financial 
reporting requirement.  The issuer’s Tier 2 reporting obligations will be 
suspended if the issuer has less than 300 shareholders.105  This suspension 
applies only after the issuer completes all of its reporting obligations during 
the year in which the SEC qualifies the offering statement.106  Finally and 
most significantly, Tier 2 offerings are exempt from all state filing and 
registration requirements.107 
Not surprisingly, the NASAA, as a body comprised of state securities 
regulators,108 was strongly opposed to state preemption.  State preemption 
divests state securities regulators involvement from all Tier 2 offerings.  
Their general position is that, without the state registration requirement, 
investors in their jurisdictions would be exposed to fraud and would be 
taken advantage of.109  They also expressed the feeling that they, as state 
regulators, were closer to any local situation and were therefore in a better 
position to oversee securities offerings occurring within their borders.110  
The legal fallout surrounding the SEC’s final controversial Regulation A 
rules will be discussed in depth in Section VI. 
 
 103. 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b) (2015). 
 104. Id. at § 230.257(b)(2)(i)(A). 
 105. Id. at § 230.257(d)(2). 
 106. Id. 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (exempting sales of securities to “qualified purchasers,” as 
defined by SEC rules, from state regulation of securities offerings).  Regulation A’s final 
rules broadly define “qualified purchaser” as “any person to whom securities are offered or 
sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering of this Regulation A.”  17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2015). 
 108. North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) is an international 
organization of security administrators devoted to investors protection.  About us, N. AM. 
SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/, archived at http://perma.cc/BS59-
KUBC (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).  In the United States, NASAA is “the voice of state and 
provincial securities regulators.”  Id.  NASAA’s jurisdiction extends to “a wide variety of 
issuers and intermediaries who offer and sell securities to the public.”  Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., Comment Letter 
in Response to the Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions 
Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act at 10, 14 (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-
NP9J (arguing that maintaining state registration of Regulation A offerings will promote 
investor protections by States as intended by Congress). 
 110. See, e.g., William M. Beatty, Sec. Adm’r, State of Wash., Dep’t of Fin. Insts., 
Comment Letter in Response to the Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional 
Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act at 3 (Mar. 24, 2014),  
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-76.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E9MT-
T3B3.  (“In light of the local nature of these offerings, state regulation of these offerings is 
essential to investor protection and the facilitation of capital formation”). 
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V. BUT WILL THOSE MODIFICATIONS MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 
But will Regulation A, even with its modifications that seek to strike a 
compromise between capital seekers and state regulators, make the 
Regulation A private offering exemption a more appealing alternative?  
The answer is no.  To support the “no” conclusion, the best approach is to 
engage in a speculative exercise.  The exercise posits why, in theory, an 
issuer might choose Regulation A over another viable alternative and then 
provides rebutting arguments against the position of choosing regulation A 
over another viable position. 
A. Why Regulation A (in theory)? 
Theoretically speaking, when would an issuer choose Regulation A 
(as modified) over some other exemption?  If the issuer is being thoughtful 
about the decision, it would choose Regulation A only when the Regulation 
A exemption provides something or allows for something that other 
exemptions do not.  In that regard, Regulation A has two distinguishing 
characteristics that are present both before and after its modifications under 
the J.O.B.S. Act. 
First, under Regulation A, the issuer can advertise for and publicly 
solicit potential investors.111  Thus, under Regulation A, the issuer can cast 
a wider net when seeking potential investors.  This theoretically allows the 
issuer to draw from a bigger pool of potential investors and therefore 
increases the likelihood that the issuer will raise the amount of equity it is 
seeking from the offering. 
Second, Regulation A has no investor qualification criteria.112  
Anyone, regardless of income, net worth, or financial knowledge and 
sophistication, can participate in a Regulation A offering.113  In theory, this 
increases the pool of potential investors that can participate in the issuer’s 
offering.  Also, the issuer can target and include selected individuals as 
investors regardless of their net worth, income, or financial sophistication.  
 
 111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a) (2015) (“At any time before the qualification of an offering 
statement, including before the non-public submission or public filing of such offering 
statement, an issuer or any person authorized to act on behalf of an issuer may communicate 
orally or in writing to determine whether there is any interest in a contemplated securities 
offering.”). 
 112. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.263 (2015) (imposing no investor requirement 
criteria).  Typically when an offering exemption has investor qualifications or criteria, those 
qualifications and criteria will be specified in the exemption.  Regulation A, consisting of 
Rules 251-263, makes no mention of investor qualifications or criteria. 
 113. Id.   
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Thus, a Regulation A offering allows the issuer to include a broader 
investor pool, one that can include both sophisticated and unsophisticated 
investors as well as both high- and low-net-worth individuals, whereas 
under other exemptions, unsophisticated and low net worth investors would 
be excluded such as under the Regulation D Rule 506 offering 
exemption.114  These two distinguishing Regulation A characteristics may, 
in some circumstances, make Regulation A the preferable choice, at least in 
theory. 
B. But Why Not Regulation A in Practice? 
But in practice, these perceived Regulation A advantages do not seem 
to be factors that an issuer considers when deciding to do a private offering 
under Regulation A.  Also, what may seem to be an advantage of being 
able to draw from a larger pool of “lay investors,” upon further 
examination, is not advantageous at all and is not something that factors 
heavily into an issuer’s decision-making. 
i. Regulation A Filers Still Sought Out High Net Worth and High 
Income Individuals 
First off, Title II of the J.O.B.S. Act changed the solicitation rules.115  
Now, under added Regulation D Rule 506(c), issuers can solicit and 
advertise for investors with the caveat that actual investors must be 
accredited.116  Prior to the J.O.B.S. Act, soliciting investors for a Regulation 
D Rule 506 offering was prohibited.117  By contrast, Regulation A allows 
for both public solicitation and places no stipulations on the investor’s 
qualifications.118  While this is a very real difference in theory, in practice, 
 
 114. Id. at § 230.506(b)(2)(ii). 
 115. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (J.O.B.S. Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 
201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C.) (directing SEC to revise solicitation rules applicable to offers and sales pursuant 
Rule 506). 
 116. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2015).  Rule 506(c) was added pursuant to the J.O.B.S. 
Act’s Title II.  J.O.B.S. Act § 201(a)(1). 
 117. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2015) (effective Sept. 15, 2008 to Mar. 27, 2012) 
(amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (J.O.B.S. Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 
201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012)) (preventing promotion unless allowed under § 
230.504(b)(1) or § 230.506(c)), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013) (Pre-J.O.B.S. Act 
version, not providing an exception for promotion under the Rule 506(c) provision, which 
provision allows advertising and solicitation as long as the actual investors are accredited). 
 118. See 17 C.F.R. § 255(a) (2015) (allowing for public solicitation); 17 C.F.R. § 
230.251(a) (2015) (imposing no specific requirements for the investor’s qualifications and 
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this perceived Regulation A advantage does not manifest itself in any 
meaningful way. 
The above conclusion is based on a review of forty-two Regulation A 
filings covering the period from 2008 to 2014.119  The research found that 
the perceived advantages related to the more liberal Regulation A public 
solicitation rules, and the opportunity to cast a wider net to include both 
accredited and “lay investors,” did not bear itself out in practice.  In fact, 
researching these forty-two filings showed that a large majority of the 
Regulation A filings (some twenty-four percent) likely could have been 
filed and were perhaps better suited to be filed under a less cumbersome, 
less expensive, and less time-consuming exemption other than the 
Regulation A exemption that the issuer chose.120 
For example, out of the forty-two filings reviewed, six issuers 
explicitly limited their investor pool to accredited investors (i.e. investors 
with a net worth greater than $1 million or income in excess of $200,000 in 
each of the two most recent years) and four issuers limited their investor 
pool to financially savvy investors.121  Accordingly, in these instances, 
whatever benefits that could have been derived from filing under 
Regulation A such as being open to all investors regardless of income, net 
worth, or financial sophistication, was negated by the stipulation that the 
investors either be accredited or be financially savvy; i.e. the requirements 
for the more often used Rule 506 exemption.122 
Additionally, at least ten of the filings stipulated that any participating 
investor had to invest a minimum of $1,000 with one issuer placing a 
minimum investment at $249,750.123  Though not an incredibly large 
amount, the investor minimum again cuts against the grain of being 
available and open to all investors regardless of income or net worth.  
Setting a minimum investment amount at $1,000 is still a cap of some 
significance in that it prevents any “layperson” who does not have at least 
$1,000 of disposable income available from participating in the offering.  
 
no limits on the amounts of investments). 
 119.  See infra Appendix: Part A for the list of forty-two Regulation A filings selected 
randomly over this period. 
 120.  The twenty-four percent calculation is based on the six Regulation A filings noted 
infra in Appendix: Part B, Category 1(accredited investors), and Category 2 (sophisticated 
investors).  The investor must meet one of these two criteria to be a qualified investor under 
Regulation D’s Rule 506.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (describing the required 
expertise when a purchaser is unaccredited). 
 121.  See infra Appendix: Part B, Categories 1 and 2 for a corresponding explanation. 
 122.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015). 
 123.  See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 4 which lists the issuers that required an 
investor minimum of $1,000. 
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Many in the general population do not have $1,000 or more at their 
disposal to invest.  Placing an investment minimum suggests that the 
issuers are discriminating somewhat as to the type of investor they are 
targeting for their offering; yet another aspect that is contrary to what one 
would expect from Regulation A filers. 
ii. Very Few Regulation A Filers Took Advantage of the More 
Liberal Public Advertising and Solicitation Rules 
Recall that Regulation A allows the issuer to publicly solicit 
investors.124  Publicly soliciting investors is a practice that was previously 
prohibited under Regulation D’s Rule 506.125  Thus, if one were being 
thoughtful about using Regulation A, then you would expect the issuer 
filing under Regulation A to take advantage of this aspect and cast his net 
as widely as possible.  But only nine filings out of the forty-two stated that 
their “Plan of Distribution” would involve publicly soliciting investors.126 
In sum, in the vast majority of the Regulation A filings reviewed, 
there were perhaps only three issuers that clearly filed under Regulation A 
because of the distinguishing aspects that Regulation A affords; namely, 
the ability to publicly solicit investors and the ability to include any and all 
potential investors regardless of net worth, income, or financial 
sophistication.  All the other Regulation A filers were structured such that 
they could have filed under Rule 506 and were perhaps better suited for 
Rule 506 but for some unclear reason they chose the more cumbersome 
Regulation A path.  In the interest of full disclosure, there were at least ten 
Regulation A filings that were prepared without counsel’s assistance.127  
This conclusion was based on the fact that these filings noted either “n/a” 
or “none” (or some similar indication) where the issuer is asked to indicate 
whether counsel prepared or assisted in preparing the filing.128  It is 
plausible to conclude that these “lay filers” may not have been as familiar 
with the rules surrounding exempt offerings and the different options each 
exemption provides.  Thus, it is possible that these “lay filers” may have 
 
 124. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (2015) (describing the requirements that apply when 
securities are offered in a circular). 
 125. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013) (Pre-J.O.B.S. Act version of statute, not 
providing an exception for promotion under the Rule 506(c) provision, which provision 
allows advertising and solicitation as long as the actual investors are accredited). 
 126. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 6 for a list of companies giving a clear intent 
to solicit investors publicly. 
 127. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 5 for list of issuers who prepared their 
Regulation A filing without counsel’s assistance. 
 128. Id. 
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chosen an exemption other than Regulation A if they were better informed 
or had more knowledge about the available choices. 
iii. Lay Investors and Low Net Worth or Low Income Individuals 
Do Not Apply 
The takeaway from all of this is clear.  Even in the case of the 
Regulation A filers, issuers seemed to prefer investors that had obtained at 
least some degree of “financial substance,”129 either through an 
accumulated mass of wealth, from earning a solid income, or by otherwise 
being financially savvy.130  The reasoning behind this preference is clear, is 
understandable, and further drives home the point that just because an 
issuer is able to cast a wider investment net does not mean that it is prudent 
to do so.  Investors who do not have a critical mass of net worth or do not 
earn an income that allows for a fair amount of disposable income make for 
a less stable investor pool. 
First off, low net worth or low income investors are more likely to be 
investing money that they can ill afford to lose.  Second, investors of this 
type tend to be a cumbersome lot for the issuer because:  (1) they may have 
a disproportionate amount of money invested in the venture relative to their 
overall net worth; and (2) they are more likely to be unfamiliar with the 
speculative nature of investing and the true risks involved.  In these 
instances, the issuer can expect this investor type to be burdensome.  It is 
foreseeable that these unsophisticated investors will make frequent 
inquiries into how much and when they will get their money back.  They 
may frequently need and require a lot of handholding in terms of 
explaining what is going on; especially if the issuer’s business takes a 
downturn.  In sum, investors of this nature can and often are more trouble 
than they are worth.  Thus, if an issuer finds itself in the situation where 
Regulation A is the only viable option due to the nature of its potential 
investor pool, then the issuer should reassess whether it should be doing a 
private securities offering at all. 
This discussion drives home the point as to Regulation A’s limited 
use.  If, in fact, it were the case that your investor pool was neither wealthy 
nor sophisticated, then you have a tenuous investor pool at best.  For these 
reasons, even where issuers were filing under Regulation A, they 
nonetheless structured their offerings such that “lay investors” would be 
 
 129. See infra Appendix: Part B, Categories 1-5 for list of companies that placed SOME 
kind of investor qualification, or criteria as a pre-cursor to investing – whether that be 
financial sophistication, income or net worth minimums or a minimum investment amount. 
 130. Id. 
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excluded, and in many cases, the issuer specifically targeted accredited 
investors to the exclusion of all others.131  The end result is, although the 
issuer filed under Regulation A, those filings more often than not could 
have been filed under another less cumbersome exemption such as 
Regulation D’s Rule 506. 
Why issuers chose to file under Regulation A in spite of not making 
use of Regulation A’s distinguishing characteristics is not clear.  The likely 
reason is that the issuer simply did not have a full grasp of all the exempt 
offering choices and the distinguishing characteristics of each.  Again, it is 
believed that a lot of these choices to file under Regulation A were done 
without counsel’s assistance or were otherwise ill-advised. 
C. How will the J.O.B.S. Act Modifications Affect the Regulation A 
Decision? 
In spite of all the political wrangling and the SEC’s efforts to appease 
state regulators, the Regulation A end product has resulted in offering 
exemptions that are still deficient and still fail to consider the end user.  
Tier 1 contains all of the same onerous provisions that existed prior to the 
J.O.B.S. Act’s revisions, and the Tier 2 regime adds a layer of financial 
disclosure and reporting requirements that rivals publicly held company 
disclosures.132  Therefore, both the Tier 1 and Tier 2 offering regimes are 
still weighed down with onerous requirements that will cause most 
potential issuers to choose other options. 
TIER 1 (for offerings up to $20 million) – In essence, the Tier 1 
requirements are exactly the same as they were prior to the J.O.B.S. Act 
with the exception that the offering cap has been raised from $5 million to 
$20 million.133  Other than that, the exemption is exactly the same as the 
pre-J.O.B.S. Act version.134  Under the Tier 1 requirements, the Regulation 
 
 131. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 1 for list of Regulation A filers that limited its 
investor pool to accredited investors as defined under Regulation D, Rule 506.  See 17 
C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (outlining the requirements for an unaccredited investor). 
 132. See Form 1-A, 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-
a.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H6QP-GU3Q (providing the instructions and form 
related to the offering statement); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.252, .257 (2015) (outlining the 
conditions that, when fulfilled, remove the need to register, and providing the requirements 
of an offering statement and sales report). 
 133. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(1) (2015) (limiting Tier 1 prices to a maximum of 
$20 million), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (limiting exemption amount to a 
maximum of $5 million). 
 134. Compare 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(1), .252, .257 (2015), with 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-
.252, .257 (2014) (effective to June 18, 2015) (amended by 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015)) (stating 
identical requirements for registration, offering statements, and sales reports). 
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A aspects that made it undesirable prior to its modifications under the 
J.O.B.S. Act are still present; namely the lack of state preemption which 
therefore necessitates the need for the issuer to comport with filing and 
registration requirements in each jurisdiction in which the issuer is offering 
securities. 
The Tier 1 offering regime structured as it is will result in Regulation 
A remaining in its current state of dormancy because the large majority of 
potential Regulation A issuers would be the ones whose offerings’ sizes 
would be for $20 million or less.  This is because if the issuer were to offer 
securities for larger amounts, then more than likely the issuer would be of a 
size and sophistication where they would choose more desirable and less 
cumbersome exemptions such as Regulation D’s Rule 506. 
Again, this conclusion is based on our review of some forty-two 
Regulation A Filings between 2008 and 2014.  Those filings revealed 
issuers, a majority of whom were lacking in sophistication, as evidenced by 
the deficient manner in which their Form 1-A offering statements were 
completed.135  That, coupled with the very low qualification rate mentioned 
earlier, suggests that the problems with Regulation A prior to the J.O.B.S. 
Act will persist as the modifications did not address those problems in any 
meaningful way, if at all. 
TIER 2 – Similarly, with the Tier 2 offering regime, the costs to 
comply still outweigh the corresponding benefits, even with the offering 
limit raised to $50 million.136  This is primarily because once an issuer’s 
infrastructure has reached a size where it is in a position to raise up to $50 
million, there are alternatives (again Regulation D’s Rule 506) that work 
much better for the issuer than Regulation A and are much less 
cumbersome. 
As discussed earlier, under the Tier 2 offering regime, the issuer must 
provide audited financial statements in its filing137 and must also provide 
audited financial statements on an annual basis.138  Accordingly, any issuer 
choosing to offer securities under Regulation A’s Tier 2 regime would have 
to be a company that has reached a critical mass in terms of size and 
infrastructure to absorb the costs involved with providing audited financial 
statements in its filing along with providing annual audited financial 
statements going forward on an ongoing basis.  Looking again to the pool 
of potential investors, there could be a number of possible scenarios.  
 
 135. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (outlining the characteristics needed when an 
investor is unaccredited). 
 136. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2015). 
 137. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.252(a), 239.90 (2015). 
 138. 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b) (2015). 
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Again, the only one where Regulation A is the superior choice over other 
options is the scenario where a significant portion, at least a majority, of the 
issuer’s potential investor pool is “lay investors.”  Otherwise one of the 
other exemptions (namely Regulation D’s Rule 506) would make for a 
more logical choice.  If this is in fact the case, then it is reasonable to 
conclude that no individual investor would have a large amount of money 
to invest because if they did, they would more than likely meet the 
accredited investor criteria.  Your pool of investors would therefore be a 
considerably large number of “lay investors” with each investor 
contributing a nominal amount to the total offering. 
Though this scenario in theory is possible, again, it is not likely.  
Individuals with little or no disposable income are few and far between in 
the realm of private placements.  The only clear advantage that Regulation 
A would have over other options would be to tap into this nearly non-
existent pool of “lay investors”; an investment pool that is neither viable, 
desirable, nor prevalent enough to warrant choosing an exemption 
specifically tailored for their participation.  None of these dynamics would 
change under the modified Regulation A’s two tiered offering regime.  
Regulation A simply does not reconcile to the realities of the market place. 
VI. THE STATE PREEMPTION CONTROVERSY 
Further weighing Regulation A down and bolstering the argument for 
its obsolescence are the current and pending controversies surrounding the 
Commission’s state preemption decision for Tier 2 offerings.  As discussed 
earlier, Regulation A, before its revisions under the J.O.B.S. Act, did not 
allow for state preemption.139  Pre J.O.B.S. Act, an issuer had to satisfy the 
registration requirements in each jurisdiction in which the issuer was 
offering its securities.140  Let’s appreciate the added regulatory burden that 
this posed by using a real life Regulation A filing as an example. 
Godspell LLC is a limited liability company that filed under 
Regulation A in February of 2010 (pre J.O.B.S. Act).141  According to its 
 
 139. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2012) (not including Regulation A offerings among 
offerings that are exempt from state registration and filing requirements). 
 140. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-839, Securities Regulation: Factors 
That May Affect Trends in Regulation A Offerings 8 (2012) (describing how pre-sale 
registration of an offering is required under state law).  Again, this was required because 
there was no state preemption under the federal securities law for Regulation A offerings.  
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2012) (excluding Regulation A offerings from available 
exemptions). 
 141. The Godspell LLC, Regulation A Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 
1933 (Form 1-A) (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/10/9999999997-
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Form 1-A offering Circular as of 1/31/2010, Godspell had total assets of 
$100 and no liabilities.142  According to its filing documents, Godspell LLC 
was planning on offering securities in California, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York.143  
Accordingly, in addition to filing its Form 1-A at the federal level, 
Godspell LLC then had to research and comply with each of the 
registration requirements in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York respectively.144  
These added burdens required additional layers of expense, company 
resources, and perhaps the most precious commodity of all—time.  Pre 
J.O.B.S. Act, choosing a different exemption meant avoiding all of these 
registration and compliance hurdles.  Because of this, many issuers 
assessed all that would be involved in doing a Regulation A filing and then 
ultimately chose to go in a different direction because the cost to comply 
far outweighed the benefits.  The historically low use of Regulation A 
corroborates this conclusion.145 
As discussed earlier, the Commission’s final rules did in fact preempt 
state filing requirements for all Tier 2 offerings (i.e. amounts between $20 
million and $50 million).146  But, as expected, state regulators in two 
jurisdictions have filed suit in reaction to the state preemption decision for 
Tier 2 offerings, and there are likely to be additional suits to follow.147  The 
legal challenges to Regulation A will be discussed in Part B of this 
section.148  Accordingly, the fight and the arguments loom, casting a long 
shadow over those who might choose to venture down the now murky 
Regulation A path.149 
 
10-001230, archived at https://perma.cc/LE2T-3PXA. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 50. 
 145. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-839, Securities Regulation: Factors 
That May Affect Trends in Regulation A Offerings (2012), at 9, Figure 1.  The Report 
conveys Regulation A’s declining use which peaked at 116 filings in 1997 and has declined 
steadily through 2011 where there were only 19 Regulation A filings in 2011. 
 146. Under 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) sales of securities to “qualified purchasers,” as defined 
by SEC rules, are exempt from state regulation of securities offerings.  15 U.S.C. 
§77r(b)(3)(2012).  Regulation A’s final rules broadly define “qualified purchaser” as “any 
person to whom securities are offered or sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering.”  17 C.F.R. § 
230.256 (2015). 
 147. Lindeen v. SEC, No. 15-1149 (D.C. Cir. filed May 22, 2015) and Galvin v. S.E.C., 
No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. filed May 22, 2015) (cases consolidated May 27, 2015).  
 148. See supra Part IV-B (discussing the legal challenges to Regulation A). 
 149. See 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015) (detailing the stipulations of Regulation A). 
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A. The General Arguments Against State Preemption 
Opposition against state preemption, not surprisingly, is strongest with 
the state regulators, those entities that would be undertaking the task of 
approving the application for any company seeking to issue securities in 
that particular jurisdiction.  The arguments from those opposing state 
preemption essentially boil down to positions such as:  “[state preemption] 
would handicap the states from providing oversight . . . at a time when the 
Commission lacks the resources to police this area.”150  “Regulation A 
securities can be high-risk offerings that may also be susceptible to fraud, 
making protections provided by the State regulators an essential 
[feature].”151  “State regulators are more accountable to local investors and 
businesses and have the ability to respond quickly to fraudulent offerings 
occurring in their own backyards.”152 
These arguments are valid, quite valid in fact, but there is a major flaw 
in their reasoning.  These opposing voices fail to consider the issue in its 
broader context.  Yes, it is reasonable to conclude that an additional state 
regulatory component would likely result in fewer instances of investors 
being defrauded.  But to what end?  When you read the comment letters 
from the state regulators, they do make compelling arguments in projecting 
dire outcomes for investors if they (the state regulators) are not allowed to 
inject themselves into the registration process to champion the small 
investors’ cause.  But without exception, what is glaringly absent from all 
of their recriminations is the effect that the state registration requirement 
will have on Regulation A’s actual use.  That part of the argument is absent 
from their protests.  It is absent because if these state regulators included or 
even considered the practical side of the argument, they would have to 
concede that the state registration requirement bogs down an already overly 
burdened private offering exemption.  Nonetheless, the Commission has 
acquiesced somewhat to their pleas by keeping the state filing requirements 
 
 150. Comment Letter from William M. Beatty, Sec. Adm’r, State of Wash., Dep’t of Fin. 
Insts. Sec. Div., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 1 (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-76.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E9MT-
T3B3. 
 151. Comment Letter from William M. Beatty, Sec. Adm’r, State of Wash., Dep’t of Fin. 
Insts. Sec. Div., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 2 (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-76.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E9MT-
T3B3 (quoting 157 Cong. Rec. H7, 229-01(daily ed. Nov. 2, 2011) (statement of Rep. 
Peters)). 
 152. Comment Letter from William M. Beatty, Sec. Adm’r, State of Wash., Dep’t of Fin. 
Insts. Sec. Div., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 4 (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-76.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E9MT-
T3B3. 
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for Tier 1 offerings which, as discussed earlier, is a mistake. 
Additionally, proponents for the state registration requirement will 
point to Regulation D Rule 506 and the apparent high incidents of investor 
fraud as another argument as to why Regulation A should not be similarly 
exposed.153  In response to that argument, all laws have their limits.  It is 
hard to legislate people into doing the right thing.  Laws designed to protect 
investors, just like all other laws, have to strike a balance between (in this 
case) protecting investors while creating a regulatory regime that is worthy 
from a cost-benefit standpoint.  To their credit, at least with respect to 
Regulation A’s Tier 2 offerings, the Commission decided to take a stand in 
defiance of the state regulators. 
B. State Preemption and the Question of Legality 
Although the SEC has made its final decision regarding state 
preemption, early signs indicate that State regulators plan to fight the SEC 
through the courts on the state preemption issue.  William F. Galvin, the 
secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, has joined Monica 
Lindeen, Montana State Auditor ex officio Montana Commissioner of 
Securities and Insurance, to consolidate their suit; they have filed a 
Petitioners’ Preliminary Statement of Issues against the SEC, contesting 
state preemption’s legality in the absence of what they feel is the express 
statutory and legal authority to do so.154 
The Preliminary Statement of Issues sets out 4 key issues or questions 
for the court to address. 
1.  Whether the Commission’s adoption of the rule—which 
defines “qualified purchaser” to mean “any person to whom 
securities are offered or sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering under 
Regulation A—is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise is unlawful because it conflicts with the plain 
language of Title IV of the J.O.B.S. Act and Section 18(b)(3) of 
the Securities Act . . . . 
 
 
 153. See Informed Investor Advisory: Private Placement Offerings—Are You an 
Informed Investor?, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, http://www.nasaa.org/22284/informed-
investor-alert-private-placement-offerings/, archived at http://perma.cc/C72Y-E6Y2 (last 
updated Sept. 2013) (detailing what an investor should know about Regulation D, Rule 506, 
including that fraud is more likely for Regulation D offerings because of the lack of 
regulatory review). 
 154. Petitioners’ Joint Preliminary Statement of Issues, Lindeen v. S.E.C., No. 15-1149 
(D.C. Cir. filed May 22, 2015) (consolidated with Galvin v. S.E.C., No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. 
filed May 22, 2015)). 
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2. Whether the Commission Violated Sections 2(b), 3(b)(2)(G), 
and 18(b)(3) of the Securities Act and Section 3(f) of the 
Securities Exchange Act by preempting state registration and 
qualification laws in a manner that is inconsistent with the public 
interest and the protection of investors. 
 
3. Whether the Commission violated § 2(b) of the Securities Act 
and Section 3(f) of the Securities Exchange Act by failing to 
adequately consider the protection of investors and the public 
interest, among other factors, prior to its adoption of the rule. 
 
4. Whether the Commission otherwise acted in a manner that is 
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise 
unlawful within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., or other applicable law in adopting 
its amendments and revisions to Regulation A’s exemption from 
state registration and qualification laws under the Securities 
Act.155 
As of the date of this writing, the suit was still in its pleading stages, 
so the regulators’ respective arguments were unavailable prior to this 
article’s publishing.  The suit, however, is likely to follow the arguments 
the NASAA put forth when Regulation A’s final rules were still pending 
and the Commission was still inviting comment letters on the proposed 
rules.156 
The NASAA’s argument gets its traction from the 1933 Act’s Section 
18.157  Section 18 says that state law shall not govern “covered 
securities.”158  Section 18 goes on further to define a “covered security” as 
(among other things) “sales to qualified purchasers.”159  Section 18 gives 
the Commission the authority to define a “qualified purchaser” with the 
stipulation that any definition must be “consistent with the public interest 
and the protection of investors.”160 
The Commission has used its rulemaking authority granted under 
Section 18 to define a “qualified purchaser” simply as one who invests in a 
 
 155. Id. at 2-3. 
 156. Comment Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 2-4 (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-
NP9J. 
 157. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012) (Exemption From State Securities Regulation Offerings). 
 158. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(a)(1), (2) (2012). 
 159. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2012). 
 160. Id. 
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Tier 2 Regulation A offering.161  The NASAA, in its comment letter to the 
Commission, attacked this definition as it applies to Regulation A, noting 
that an investor in a Tier 2 Regulation A offering should not be defined as a 
“qualified purchaser.”162  They argue that to do so would be inconsistent 
with the public interest and the protection of investors.163 
Unlike Regulation D’s Rule 506, Regulation A does not place any 
restrictions on who can invest in a Regulation A offering.  Under Rule 506, 
investors are restricted to investors who are either accredited or have 
“knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that [they 
are] capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective 
investment . . . .”164, while anyone can invest in a Regulation A offering 
regardless of accredited investor status or investor sophistication.165  The 
NASAA’s argument then is simply that defining a Regulation A offeree as 
a “qualified purchaser” would be misplaced and inappropriate because the 
potential Regulation A investor could be one who lacks the financial 
acumen and sophistication to fend for himself.166  It is likely that any 
lawsuits filed opposing the Commissions’ definition of “qualified 
purchaser” will have arguments similar to the NASAA’s. 
The NASAA’s argument has merit.  As Regulation A is written, the 
Regulation A investor could be an individual with no financial 
sophistication whatsoever.167  The NASAA and the state regulators in its 
association believe this issue is clear cut and unequivocal, but the matter 
contains much more nuance where reasonable minds could differ. 
The legality of defining a Regulation A investor as a “qualified 
purchaser” is a matter of judgment, and yes, a matter of statutory 
interpretation as to whether the Commission is over stepping its rulemaking 
authority granted under Section 18.  Section 18 clearly states that the 
Commission has the authority to define a “qualified purchaser” but requires 
the Commission’s definition to be “consistent with the public interest and 
 
 161. 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2015). 
 162. Comment Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 2-4 (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-
NP9J. 
 163. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). 
 164. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2015). 
 165. Again, a review of Regulation A reveals no stated qualification criteria for its 
investors. 
 166. Comment Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc., to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 8 (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
11-13/s71113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-NP9J. 
 167. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2015) (stipulating the general 
requirements of an investor under Regulation A). 
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the protection of investors.”168  To conclude that the Commission is 
overreaching in this case, the fact finder must conclude that defining a 
“qualified purchaser” as one who invests in an exempt offering under 
Regulation A is inconsistent with the public interest and the protection of 
investors.  How is such a determination made?  This assessment is based 
strictly on the rule maker’s (the SEC in this case) judgment. 
Rulemaking can never be stated in absolutes.  A good rule is one that 
is written with feasibility and practicality considerations.  What good is an 
exemption that provides the ultimate investor protection but is too 
burdensome and cost prohibitive to be a viable alternative?  Accordingly, 
both feasibility and practicality considerations should be scrutinized when 
analyzing the government’s intent behind Regulation A.  To define 
Regulation A’s Tier 2 offerees and investors as “qualified purchasers” 
would be the Commission making the same practical considerations as it 
did when it drafted some aspects of Regulation D.  Very few rules can be 
written with absolutes.  The drafter almost always has to make some 
concessions for practical considerations and (in this case) the rule must 
strike the right balance between protecting investors and keeping the 
exemption as one that remains viable from a cost-benefit standpoint. 
The following example illustrates how concessions are made during 
the drafting process.  In drafting Regulation D, the Commission made some 
concessions in deference to practical considerations that can result in 
certain investors participating in a Rule 506 offering who, in actuality, are 
persons who probably should not be participants in such offerings.  Take 
for example the “accredited investor” definitions under Regulation D.169  
Under the Rule, you qualify as an accredited investor if your net worth 
exceeds $1,000,000.170  By this definition, a hypothetical John Doe, who 
has never allocated one penny of his earnings towards investing or saving, 
and who might not know a prospectus from a marketing brochure could 
qualify as an accredited investor if his winning lottery ticket put his net 
worth over the one million dollar mark.  His million plus winnings could 
go to a private venture of his choosing and the law would define him as an 
accredited investor; one for whom no special considerations, protections, or 
disclosures would be required.  Here, with Regulation D, the Commission 
chose the route of defining “accredited investor” in terms of bright line 
quantifiable metrics for practical considerations.  The bright line definitions 
give issuers seeking to use the Regulation clear and unequivocal guidance 
 
 168. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3)(2012). 
 169. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(2015) (giving various definitions of those persons and 
entities that fall under the accredited investor definition). 
 170. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2015). 
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on who falls within the definition.  This concession was done for reasons of 
efficiency and practicality, in spite of the fact that some investors may fall 
through its fissures.  Further, Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 
mandates that rules must also take into consideration matters such as 
practical considerations that facilitate the formation of capital.171 
The same practical considerations and judgments need to come into 
play with the Commission and its Regulation A rulemaking.  Yes, it is 
possible (and likely) that defining a “qualified purchaser” as being a Tier 2 
Regulation A investor would result in some investors who shouldn’t be in 
that space.  But the rule should be drafted with practical considerations in 
mind as well.  Additionally, as discussed earlier, issuers will be self-
selecting.  Regulation A filers will more than likely seek out either 
accredited or sophisticated investors and will leave the unenlightened 
alone. 
Additionally, in the proposed rule itself, the Commission also believes 
that, “substantial investor protections embedded in the issuer eligibility 
conditions, limitations on investment, disclosure requirements, 
qualification process and ongoing reporting requirements . . . could address 
potential concerns that may arise as a result of the preemption of state 
securities law registration and qualification requirements.”172  Also let’s not 
lose sight of the fact that the provisions of Section 12(a)(2) apply so the 
investor will always have legal remedies under the law available after the 
fact.173  Some may say prevention before the harm occurs is better than 
trying to remedy a harm after the fact. 
Again I respond with the mantra that practical considerations 
necessitate some acquiescence and compromise in the rulemaking.  In this 
case, foregoing the state registration requirement for Tier 2 issuers is one of 
those practical considerations and the legality of such action should be 
upheld.  That is if Regulation A has any chance of being viable at all. 
In sum, given the uncertainty, and the pending and future litigation 
 
 171. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012) (“Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is 
engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is 
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in 
addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation.”). 
 172. Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 
79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3969 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-23/pdf/2013-30508.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/EGF3-NL3Y. 
 173. Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 grants relief to investors who can 
show that the prospectus contained a misstatement or an omission if the misstatement or 
omission were material in nature.  15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2012).  Section 12(a)(2) essentially 
grants the relief of refunding the investors’ money.  Id. 
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that is looming over the Commission’s final Regulation A rules, these 
aspects are additional deterrents to using the Regulation A exemption.  The 
last thing a small business needs is a potential lawsuit related to its exempt 
securities offering. 
C. The State’s Response: A Streamlined Protocol for Regulation A 
Filings 
To the State’s credit, they have made efforts to streamline the state 
filing and registration requirements.  On March 11, 2014, the North 
American Securities Administration Association announced that its 
members voted to approve what they describe as a coordinated and more 
streamlined filing and registration process.174  The NASAA describes its 
new “streamlined” review program as follows: 
NASAA has developed streamlined multi-state review protocols for 
Regulation A and Regulation A+ offerings to ease regulatory compliance 
costs on small companies seeking to raise capital.  Through this program, 
launched in May 2014, Regulation A filings are made in one place and 
distributed electronically to all states.  Lead examiners will be appointed as 
the primary point of contact for a filer and each state will be given 10 
business days for review.  The lead examiners alone will interact with the 
issuer to resolve any deficiencies.175 
The new Coordinated Review Program (CRP or Program) is to work 
as follows.  On day one, issuers desiring to avail themselves to this 
Program will e-mail an electronic copy of its Regulation A filing (the 
issuer’s Form 1-A) along with all accompanying exhibits and such to the 
State of Washington who will act as the program coordinator.176  The 
program coordinator will then distribute these documents to all the states in 
which the issuer has selected in its application materials.177  Within three 
business days after receiving the application materials, the program 
coordinator is required to select both a disclosure examiner and a lead 
examiner (assuming registration is sought in both types of jurisdictions).  
Ten days after the program coordinator selects the lead examiners, the lead 
 
 174. N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, NASAA Members Approve Streamlined Multistate 
Coordinated Review Program (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.nasaa.org/29699/nasaa-
members-approve-streamlined-multi-state-coordinated-review-program/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/3N7E-KHNP. 
 175. NASAA Multi-state Coordinated Review Program, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, 
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Coordinated-Review-Chart.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/5EW3-Y224 (last visited Nov. 29, 2015). 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id.  
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examiners are required to draft and circulate a proposed comment letter to 
all the other disclosure and merit states in which the issuer is seeking 
registration for its offering.178 
To be clear of what is implied here, the lead examiners have ten days 
to review the Regulation A filing and prepare a comment letter on 
issues/deficiencies that the lead examiner surfaces through its review.  The 
lead examiners are then required to circulate that comment letter to all the 
other participating jurisdictions.  Those states then have five additional 
business days in which to communicate any concerns or comments to the 
lead examiners.179  Within three additional business days, the lead examiner 
is required to make any necessary revisions and then send this initial 
comment letter to the issuer.  “If there are no deficiencies in the 
application, no comments will be necessary and the registration will be 
cleared by the lead examiners within 21 business days after it is filed.”180 
“If there are deficiencies, the lead examiners will communicate with 
the applicant and the participating jurisdictions to resolve deficiencies.  
Whenever an issuer files a response to any deficiency, the lead examiners 
will reply within five business days.”181  And this process presumably will 
repeat itself until the issuer has cleared all the cited deficiencies. 
The NASAA states that the new Coordinated Review Program will 
take a MINIMUM of thirty days.182  But in looking at the process, in all 
likelihood it will take much longer than that in most if not all the cases.  As 
discussed and noted earlier, a fair number of these Regulation A filings are 
prepared without the assistance of counsel.  These “issuer prepared filings” 
are woefully deficient in both their breadth of disclosure and their 
propriety.  It’s hard to speculate how long it would actually take to clear the 
deficiencies with these filings.  But if you take the number of Regulation A 
filings that the SEC qualified between 2008 and 2011 as a basis for 
comparison, it is reasonable to conclude that the number would be small.183 
Further, if one has had occasion to prepare a Form 1-A, you would 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Application for Coordinated Review of Regulation A Offering—Form CR-3(b), N. 
Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Coordinated-
Review-Application-Sec-3b.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZMX4-XYQL (last visited 
Nov. 29, 2015). 
 183. Between 2008 and 2011, the Commission qualified 18 total Regulation A offerings.  
By comparison, 1289 Registered Public Offerings were filed during that same time period.  
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office (GAO), Securities Regulation: Factors That May Affect 
Trends in Regulation A Offerings 11 (July, 2012), supra note 29. 
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appreciate the voluminous amount of information the issuer is required to 
furnish.  The form alone is twenty-nine pages long before any information 
is provided.184  Depending on how exacting the state regulators decide to 
be, in all likelihood, it could take up to several months to get all the 
deficiencies cleared.  Also, the issuer would be addressing these state level 
concerns on a parallel track with the Regulation A filing that it completed 
at the federal level.   
In fairness to the state regulators and their proposed program, it will 
not be known how long the process will actually take unless and until the 
program is fully implemented and up and running.  Regardless of how 
streamlined the state registration process becomes as a result of the 
NASAA’s changes, with a state component remaining as part of the 
process, that process will require additional time, effort, and expense from 
the issuer.   
In sum, the NASAA’s efforts to streamline the process are 
commendable.  But if the SEC’s final rules are somehow overturned for 
Tier 2 offerings, such a ruling would be yet another anchor weighing down 
an already encumbered exemption to the point where potential users (who 
are thoughtful about the decision) will seek a different and less 
cumbersome exemption.  If Regulation A is to have any issuer appeal and 
resurgence at all, the final rule that preempts tier 2 offerings from state 
registration must stand.   
VII. FOR ARGUMENT’S SAKE 
Although I hold firm to the conclusion that Congress should have let 
Regulation A lie and no attempt should have been made to revive it, the 
scholarly endeavor is incomplete if no effort is made to posit solutions to a 
suggested problem.185  For argument’s sake, if drafting the J.O.B.S. Act’s 
Title IV were to be revisited or reconsidered, I would suggest the 
following: 
 
 184.   See FORM 1-A-Regulation A Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, 
pt. F/S, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-a.pdf (form used in securities 
offerings made pursuant to Regulation A).   
 185.   See, e.g.,  Rutherford B. Campbell Jr., Regulation A: Small Business’ Search for a 
Moderate Capital, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 119-21 (2006) (discussing steps the commission 
should take to make Regulation A useful for small businesses).    
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A. Title IV Should Explicitly Preempt All State Blue Sky Law Filing 
Requirements 
Instead of Congress placing the onus on the Commission to hold the 
line on state preemption, Congress in its drafting of the J.O.B.S. Act’s Title 
IV should have explicitly exempted all Regulation A offerings from state 
registration and filing requirements.  Its failure to do so is leading to 
predicted and foreseeable results – litigation.  By not preempting all 
Regulation A filings explicitly through Title IV, state regulators see just 
enough legal uncertainty to make colorable claims that the Commission has 
overstepped its boundaries by creating a preemption that the Commission 
did not have the legal authority to create.  That gap in Title IV’s language 
has already sparked a trickle of lawsuits with the promise of more to 
follow.   
In this environment of legal uncertainty, potential issuers will more 
than likely avoid the Regulation A exemption altogether.  The last thing a 
small business needs in its early stages is potentially costly litigation.186 
If Congress simply re-writes preemption into the Act itself then the 
whole interpretive fight that the Commission is currently facing goes by the 
way side.  A simple act of Congress is all that is needed to side step this 
quagmire that will likely lead to ongoing and protracted litigation for the 
foreseeable future.   
B. The Fifty Million Dollar Cap Should be Lowered and the Annual 
Audited Financial Statement Requirement Should not be a Part of 
the Rule 
Each available offering exemption is a combination of tradeoffs 
between compliance costs to issuers and potential fraud exposure to 
investors.  Generally speaking, the higher the exposure risk is to investors, 
the greater the compliance burden tends to be for the issuer.187  When one 
offering exemption does a better job of balancing these two competing 
concerns, issuers tend to gravitate toward that exemption choice and will 
forego a more cumbersome option.  
 
 186.  See Comment Letter from Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
SEC Sec’y (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iv/jobstitleiv-18.pdf 
(urging the Commission to preempt state securities laws in its rulemaking).  The 
Commission ultimately wholesale adopted this very approach to preempt state securities 
laws in its rulemaking.  
 187.    For example, Regulation D’s Rule 504 caps the offering size at $1 million.  17 
C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2015).  In that instance, there are no investor qualifications nor is 
the issuer required to make any financial statement disclosures to its investors.  
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The problem with Regulation A is that it was out of balance at its 
inception with very high compliance hurdles where the corresponding 
benefit was capped at an offering size not to exceed five million dollars.188  
Though the J.O.B.S. Act has raised that cap to fifty million dollars for its 
Tier 2 offerings, it also raised the corresponding compliance hurdles 
causing Regulation A to continue to be out of balance between striking the 
right mix between investor protection and appropriate reasonable 
compliance requirements.   
For Regulation A to have any possible appeal, the cost to meet its 
compliance requirements must be in step with the benefits that can be 
derived from choosing the exemption. The following then is suggested:  to 
make Regulation A a more viable offering exemption, the exemption must 
accentuate those Regulation A aspects that make it unique from any other 
exemption.  Accordingly, the exemption must be crafted to emphasize 
those unique Regulation A characteristics instead of blunting those 
characteristics, which is what has happened with this current Regulation A 
iteration under the J.O.B.S. Act and the Commission’s final rulemaking. 
Perhaps the two most unique Regulation A characteristics are the fact 
that Regulation A has no investor qualification requirements and that the 
issuer is allowed to advertise and solicit investors.  As mentioned earlier, 
anyone can invest in a Regulation A offering regardless of net worth, 
income, or investor sophistication.189  As to the second characteristic, the 
issuer is allowed to advertise and solicit investors and all of those solicited 
investors are eligible to participate in the offering.190 
By contrast, newly revised Regulation D Rule 506(c) also allows the 
issuer to advertise and solicit investors, but the rule limits actual 
participation in the offering to accredited investors.191  No other offering 
exemption allowed issuers the choice of publicly soliciting investors and 
keeping the pool of investors open to all regardless of financial 
sophistication or accredited investor status.  Accordingly, it should follow 
that any Regulation A compliance or disclosure provisions should be 
crafted to allow the issuer to exploit and accentuate these two unique 
Regulation A offering characteristics.  If Regulation A fails in this regard 
(which has been the case historically), then potential issuers will simply 
choose another exemption.   
 
 188.    See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) amended by 17 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2015) 
(specifying five million dollar limit).   
 189.  See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.263 (2015) (revealing no investor qualifications 
or criteria in a review of Regulation A).   
 190.  Id.  
 191.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2015).    
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To take such advantage, first the Regulation A cap should be lowered.  
Fifty million dollars is too high and frankly is not necessary.  If a company 
has grown to such a size that it is in a position to do a fifty million dollar 
offering, then the company is more likely suited for either a Rule 506 
offering or perhaps even a public offering.  Regulations A’s Tier 2 offering 
regime as it is currently written is comparable to a public offering with no 
real discernible difference but for the fact that the Regulation A offering 
circular goes through a qualification process, whereas a full blown public 
offering would go through an SEC review process before being approved 
and declared effective.  What then would be the reason for choosing 
Regulation A?  What advantage would Regulation A provide that a full 
blown IPO would not?  If we are being hyper technical, some would say 
that Regulation A allows the issuer to remain as a privately held company 
if that is the issuer’s choice.  But in reality would there be any discernible 
difference?  If your offering is close to fifty million dollars, then it is more 
than likely you have a significant number of investors comprising your 
investor pool.  A significantly large investor pool where each investor is 
investing a nominal amount is the only explanation.  If the situation is any 
other, then Regulation A does not make sense where Rule 506 with no cap 
and no SEC qualification or SEC review process is involved.  Accordingly, 
the fifty million dollar cap is too high and should be lowered.    
The second suggestion would be to eliminate the audited financial 
statement requirement for Tier 2 offerings.  Under the J.O.B.S. Act 
revisions for Tier 2 offerings, the issuer is required to include audited 
financial statements along with its Form 1-A Offering Statement.192  
Additionally, the issuer is required to file audited financial statements on an 
ongoing annual basis.193  These audited financial statement requirements 
beg the question, “What is the audited financial statement’s purpose?”  
Presumably, the purpose is to protect investors by providing them with 
financial statements that have been vetted by an independent third party.  
However, do audited financial statements make sense in the Regulation A 
context?  As stated earlier, Regulation A’s unique characteristics allow the 
issuer to publicly solicit investors and allow ANYONE regardless of their 
wealth, income, or financial savvy to participate in the offering.  Assuming 
 
 192. Regulation A Offering Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, Form 1-A, 17 
C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015) prescribes the informational filing and disclosure requirements for 
Regulation A offerings.  17 C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (2015).  See 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (requiring 
the use of Form 1-A for Regulation A offerings); S.E.C., Form 1-A — Regulation A 
Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, pt. F/S(c), 
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-a.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H6QP-GU3Q 
(requiring audited financial statements for Tier 2 Regulation A offerings). 
 193. Id. 
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this is the case, what then is the justification or necessity for audited 
financial statements?  Audited financial statements would be prepared for 
an audience that likely has no interest in or is not otherwise inclined to read 
them. 
One could argue that the audited financial statement requirement is 
there simply to act as an accountability check on the issuer.  The 
assumption being that if they are required to prepare and file audited 
financial statements, then the likelihood that the issuer will act with 
integrity towards its investors increases:  a valid argument.  But the 
response hearkens back to the cost benefit assessment mentioned earlier.  
An effective Regulation A space should be one for smaller companies 
where the potential exposure to investors is limited by the company’s size 
and the amount being invested by any one investor.  In other words, if the 
parameters are set properly, then the protections are built in by the limited 
size and scope.  Here, in its effort to revive Regulation A, Congress has 
stretched Regulation A beyond its intended borders.  Accordingly, the cap 
should be lowered from $50 million to a size small enough such that 
removing the audited financial statement requirements can be justified.  
The exact number should be one that results from a study of the matter and 
an assessment as to where that “safe point” is realized.  But $50 million is 
too high. 
C. Regulation A Should Have Only One Tier with All Filers Meeting 
the Same Requirements 
The Commission’s final Regulation A rules should consist of one tier 
only with all filers having to meet the same requirements.  As discussed 
earlier, the Commission’s final Regulation A rules split the offering options 
into two tiers; Tier 1 and Tier 2.194  Tier 1 is for offerings up to twenty 
million dollars and Tier 2 is for offerings between twenty million dollars 
and fifty million dollars.195  The Tier 1 offering regime is exactly the same 
as the pre J.O.B.S. Act requirements with the exception being that the limit 
is raised from five million dollars to twenty million dollars.196  Also, Tier 2, 
as discussed earlier, allows for offerings between twenty million dollars 
and fifty million dollars but with rigorous disclosure requirements which 
 
 194. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2015). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Compare 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(1), .252, .257 (2015) with 17 C.F.R. § 230.251, 
.252, .257 (effective to June 18, 2015) (showing that Tier 1 offerings only differ from the 
previous, single-tier offering regime in aggregate amount of capital raised). 
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include annual reporting and audited financial statements.197 
The Commission’s final rulemaking with Regulation A’s two tiered 
regime highlights the fundamental problem with Congress’s attempt to re-
work Regulation A to begin with.  The whole rule making endeavor was 
done devoid of any focus or consideration for those that would be potential 
Regulation A users.  Regulation A’s intended audience was to be SMALL 
businesses; small meaning total assets more in the $50,000 - $5 million 
range.198  Again, this is based on a review of the forty-two Regulation A 
filings that were sampled for this article.  Based on these numbers and 
based on the Regulation A requirements, it is foreseeable that most of the 
potential Regulation A filers would be in that Tier 1 category, the category 
whose requirements are exactly the same as the pre J.O.B.S. Act version.  
These are the same requirements that caused issuers to avoid Regulation A 
in the first place. 
The turf war between the state and federal regulators over this topic 
has caused both sides to engage in a legislative and rule making process 
resulting in no meaningful improvements to Regulation A whatsoever.  The 
same issuers that avoided Regulation A prior to the J.O.B.S. Act will 
continue to avoid it under the Commission’s revised rules because the same 
onerous requirements remain.  Any issuer who is in a position to offer 
securities for more than twenty million dollars would have virtually no 
reason to use Regulation A as there are other exemptions that work much 
better for larger offerings. 
The end result after the J.O.B.S. Act and the Commission’s 
subsequent rulemaking for Regulation A, is virtually no change as the large 
majority of potential Regulation A filers would more than likely fall into 
the Tier 1 category.  This tier has the same disincentivizing provisions that 
existed prior to the J.O.B.S. Act. 
In sum, the suggestions are 1) re-write the J.O.B.S. Act provision and 
explicitly allow for all state blue sky law preemption; 2) lower the $50 
million cap to a level better suited for Regulation A and its intended 
audience; 3) remove both the audited financial statement filing requirement 
and the ongoing annual audited financial statement disclosure requirement; 
and 4) have only one tier with all Regulation A filers meeting the same 
requirements. 
I continue to hold firm to the position that Regulation A was a flawed 
exemption at inception and the proposed revisions will not change those 
 
 197. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(2), .257(b) (2015). 
 198. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (J.O.B.S. Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 
Stat. 306, tit. IV (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (“Small Company 
Capital Formation”). 
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flaws.  But, if Regulation A has any chance of succeeding, then state 
preemption must be a part of the new rule and audited financial statements 
in any capacity must be excluded.  Again this is simply a matter of tailoring 
the exemption’s contours with the exemption itself.  For whom was 
Regulation A intended?  What type of issuer and what type of investor?  
From looking at the Rule’s language, the intended investor was presumably 
a small to mid-size company with assets in the zero to $5 million range.  As 
far as the investors are concerned, Regulation A was drafted to allow for 
investors with little net worth, who earn modest incomes, and who have 
little, if any, financial sophistication.  Assuming that these are the types of 
investors that the exemption contemplates, what is the need for audited 
financial statements?  For whom are these statements being prepared?  
Likewise, what is the rationale for an offering size as high as $50 million?  
Again, if a company has grown to the point where it is in a position to do a 
$50 million offering, then it has out grown anything that Regulation A 
would have to offer.  This is a company that, at the very least, would either 
be looking to do an offering under Rule 506 if not a full-blown public 
offering. 
Congress should have given more thought to its targeted investor.  The 
J.O.B.S. Act’s current Regulation A revisions appear to have been done so 
without regard for both its targeted issuers and targeted investors.  Perhaps 
a re-working with these two constituents in mind would lead to a better and 
more thoughtful result.  I still hold firm that Regulation A should be done 
away with altogether.  But if Regulation A is to have any chance at revival, 
then some of those aspects should be revisited. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Regulation A was a flawed private offering exemption at its inception.  
The offering exemption was intended to be available to issuers who wished 
to include investors with modest income, modest net worth, and little, if 
any, financial sophistication.  But the problem with this targeted directive is 
that investors in this demographic are generally too scarce to serve as a 
viable demographic for most private offerings and likewise are too 
problematic to be worth the trouble of courting. 
Accordingly, the meager benefits for choosing the Regulation A route 
are disproportionate compared to the cost involved in terms of both time 
and money to comply.  The modifications under the J.O.B.S. Act will do 
little, if any, to rectify this imbalance.  Regulation A was never intended to 
be an exempt offering that allows for the raising of up to fifty million 
dollars; especially where there are other exempt offering alternatives that 
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are much better suited for offerings of this size.  The added compliance 
burdens of audited financial statements required both at filing and on an 
annual basis again are compliance mandates that show Congress’ lack of 
regard for its targeted audience.  Finally, even without all the problems 
mentioned above, the whole state preemption debacle alone is enough to 
cause issuers to tack away from Regulation A’s potential quagmires.  The 
fight between the state regulators and the Commission over this issue is a 
classic case of a political war being fought with no regard for practical 
realities.  If the state regulators ultimately win this fight, they will have 
won a battle that will assure them losing the war as a state filing 
requirement will almost assure Regulation A’s continued dormancy and 
eventual extinction.  Regulation A was a flawed offering exemption at its 
inception.  Sometimes the most appropriate thing to do is to let sleeping 
regulations lie. 
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APPENDIX:  PART A 
NOTE: 42 Regulation A filings were reviewed.  Specific information was 
gathered and summarized in Part B of this Appendix. 
 
Company Name  Filing Date 
1. EQUITYPOINT, LLC 
 
FILING DATE: 12-2008 
2. OAKLEYS SHOOTING 
RANGE, INC. 
FILING DATE: 2-2009 
 
3. LYONS BANCORP, INC. 
 
FILING DATE: 2-23-2004 
4. THE GODSPELL LLC FILING DATE: 2-23-2010 
 
5. RESONANT SOFWARE, INC. FILING DATE: 2-2009 
 
6. RICHLAND RESOURCES 
CORP. 
FILING DATE: 8-2010 
 
7. FREE MOVERS, INC. FILING DATE: 7-2010 
 
8. ABL FILM AND 
ENTERTAINMENT CORP. 
FILING DATE: 3-2010 
 
9. RECOVERY ENTERPRISES, 
INC. 
FILING DATE: 7-31-2009 
  
10. REAL SPORTS 
INVESTMENTS, LLC 
FILING DATE: 2-26-2008 
 
11. ACTIONVIEW 
INTERNATIONAL, INC.  
FILING DATE: 3-10-2010 
 
12. MNB TECHNOLOGIES, 
INC. 
FILING DATE: 8-17-2011 
 
13. LONE MOUNTAIN MINING 
COMPANY 
FILING DATE: 3-25-2009 
 
14. JUMPSTART MARKETING, 
INC. 
FILING DATE: 12-18-2008 
 
15. LIGHTSPEED SYSTEMS, 
INC. 
FILING DATE: 6-2008 
 
16. EARTHMETRIX 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
FILING DATE: 2-2008 
17. EMERGING GROWTH 
FUNDING, INC. 
FILING DATE: 6-2009 
 
18. FREEDOM MOTORS, INC. FILING DATE: 5-2011 
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19. CARDIOMEDICS, INC. 
 
FILING DATE: 2-2009 
20. ENERGY CONSERVATION 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 
FILING DATE: 11-2008 
21. EL CHUPACABRA, INC. 
 
FILING DATE: 5-19-2010 
22. THE CARLYLE ULTRA, 
INC. 
FILING DATE: 11-2010 
23. EQUITYPOINT, LLC FUND 
I SERIES 
FILING DATE: 8-2008 
24. HOME DECORATION, INC. 
 
FILING DATE: 8-2009 
25. GILPIN COMPUTER 
CONSULTANTS, INC. 
FILING DATE: 2-2009 
26. BANK OF IDAHO 
HOLDING CO. 
FILING DATE: 6-2010 
27. AFRO DOLLAR INC. 
 
FILING DATE: 10-17-2011 
28. ACTIVE CARE AT BRESSI 
RANCH LLC. 
FILING DATE: 7-13-2011 
29. BIDDEFORD AND SACO 
WATER CO. 
FILING DATE: 5-28-2010 
30. AGRI-LABORATORIES, 
LTD. 
FILING DATE: 6-17-2008 
31. ENTERTAINMENT ARTS 
RESEARCH, INC. 
FILING DATE: 4-28-2010 
32. ENVIRO-SERV, INC. 
 
FILING DATE: 5-20-2014 
33. METATRON, INC. 
 
FILING DATE: 5-1-2014 
34. NETWORKED 
EMERGENCY SYSTEMS, INC. 
FILING DATE: 5-6-2014 
35. MANEGAIN, INC. 
 
FILING DATE: 5-6-2014 
36. CYBER HOLDINGS, INC.   FILING DATE: 5-3-2014 
37. EASTON 
PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 
FILING DATE: 5-15-2014 
38. CREDITSMARTPRO, INC. 
 
FILING DATE: 5-7-2014 
39. COMMONWEALTH NEW 
ERA RACING, LLC. 
FILING DATE: 5-6-2014 
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40. CODE NAVY 
 
FILING DATE: 4-17-2014 
41. BIOSCULPTURE 
TECHNOLOGY, INC. 
FILING DATE: 5-8-2014 
 
42. ALAMO PARTNERS, LLC 
 
FILING DATE: 3-14-2014 
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APPENDIX: PART B 
NOTE:  Part B is a summary of information gathered on seven specific 
categories.  These categories were used to assess the type of investor the 
filer was seeking to participate in its offering. 
 
INVESTOR 
CRITERIA/ 
CATEGORY 
COMPANY NUMBER AND NAME 
 
1. 
 
Issuer limits offering  
to accredited 
Investors only 
 
 
 
1. EQUITYPOINT, LLC (See Exhibit C – 
Subscription Agreement- Section B, pg. 99 – 
“Investor Qualification” – Investor required to 
attest to accredited investor criteria such as 
individual income greater than $200,000 or net 
worth greater than $1,000,000) 
 
6. RICHLAND RESOURCES CORP. (Shares 
being offered exclusively to Texas residents 
who are accredited investors.  Offering 
Statement, pg. 4) 
 
23. EQUITYPOINT, LLC FUND I SERIES 
(See Exhibit C – Subscription Agreement- 
Section B, pg. 99 – “Investor Qualification” – 
Investor required to attest to accredited 
investor criteria such as individual income 
greater than $200,000 or net worth greater 
than $1,000,000) 
 
32. ENVIRO-SERV, INC. (Offering made 
primarily to one large investor committed to 
purchasing $1,000,000 of the $1,500,000 
worth of shares being offered. (pg. 12).  The 
investor attested to being an accredited 
investor as set forth in the Investment 
Agreement § 3.4, pg. 67)  
 
33. METRATON, INC. (Offering made 
primarily to one large investor committed to 
purchasing all of the $1,500,000 worth of 
shares being offered. (pg. 11).  The investor 
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attested to being an accredited investor as set 
forth in the Investment Agreement § 3.4, pg. 
94)  
 
37. EASTON PHARMACEUTICALS INC. 
(Offering made primarily to one large investor 
committed to purchasing up to $5,000,000 of 
the $5,000,000 worth of shares being offered. 
(pg. 13).  The investor attested to being an 
accredited investor as set forth in the 
Investment Agreement § 3.4, pg. 114)  
  
2. 
 
Issuer limits offering 
to “Sophisticated 
Investors”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. RECOVERY ENTERPRISE, INC. (Investor 
must attest to being knowledgeable and 
experienced in finance, securities, and 
investments.  See Exhibit 4- Subscription 
Agreement section 2.1(C) – pg. 74) 
 
11. ACTIONVIEW INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
(Investor must attest to being knowledgeable 
and experienced in finance and business 
matters.  See Exhibit 4.1 – Subscription 
Agreement – § 3.3) 
 
15. LIGHTSPEED SYSTEMS, INC. (See 
Exhibit 4 - Subscription Agreement, Section 
4(c) – pg. 119 – Investor attesting to having 
knowledge and experience in financial and 
business matters) 
 
38. ENERGY CONSERVATION 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (See Subscription 
Agreement, Section 4(c) – pg. 52 – Investor 
attesting to having knowledge and experience 
in financial and business matters) 
 
3. 
 
Issuer limits offering 
to investors who 
have a net worth of 
 
4. THE GODSPELL, LLC (Investor must have 
a minimum net worth of $60,000 (exclusive of 
house, furniture, and automobiles) and must 
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at least 
$225,000 and an 
income of at least 
$60,000 
 
have an annual gross income of at least 
$60,000.  Alternatively, the investor must have 
a liquid net worth of at least $225,000.  See 
Offering Circular Summary, pg. 11) 
 
28. ACTIVE CARE AT BRESSI RANCH 
LLC. (Net worth greater than $250,000 or 
income greater than $70,000 and a net worth 
of at least $70,000.  See Offering Statement, 
pg. 3 “Who May Invest” section) 
 
4. 
 
Minimum 
investment of  
$1,000 or more 
 
 
 
1. EQUITYPOINT, LLC (minimum investment 
of $2,500 – Exhibit C – Subscription 
Agreement – Section A – pg. 94) 
 
4. THE GODSPELL, LLC (minimum 
investment of $1,000.  Part II-Offering 
Circular, pg. 5) 
 
9. RECOVERY ENTERPRISES, INC. 
(minimum investment of $1,200.  Part II 
Offering Circular, pg. 8) 
 
20. ENERGY CONSERVATION 
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (Minimum 
investment of $11,000.  See Part II 
“Preliminary” Offering Circular, pg. 7) 
 
23. EQUITYPOINT, LLC FUND I SERIES 
(minimum investment of $2,500 – Exhibit C – 
Subscription Agreement – Section A – pg. 93) 
 
26. BANK OF IDAHO HOLDING CO. 
(minimum investment for new shareholders is 
$249,750.  See Offering Statement, pg. 12, 
first page of Preliminary Offering Circular) 
 
27. AFRO DOLLAR INC. (minimum investment 
of $1,000.  See Offering Statement, pg. 8) 
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28. ACTIVE CARE AT BRESSI RANCH 
LLC. (minimum purchase requirement of 20 
units at $1,000 per unit ($20,000).  See 
Offering Statement – Preliminary Offering 
Circular, pg. 1) 
 
29. BIDDEFORD AND SACO WATER CO. 
(minimum investment is 1 unit for $10,000 per 
unit.  See Offering Statement – Part II – 
Offering Circular – pg. 4) 
 
42. ALAMO PARTNERS, LLC (minimum 
investment amount of $10,000 per subscriber.  
See Offering Circular, pg. 19)  
 
5. 
 
Offerings prepared 
without counsel’s  
assistance 
 
 
7. FREE MOVERS, INC. (offering statement 
handwritten; space left blank as to issuer’s 
counsel.  See Offering Statement, Part I, Item 
1(h), pg. 2) 
 
10. REAL SPORTS INVESTMENT LLC 
(offering statement handwritten; no issuer’s 
counsel listed.  See Offering Statement, Part I, 
Item 1(h), pg. 2) 
 
11. ACTION VIEW INTERNATIONAL, INC.  
(offering notes specifically that counsel was 
not engaged to draft offering statement. See 
Offering Statement – Part I - Item 1 
Significant parties – pg. 2) 
 
12. MNB TECHNOLOGIES, INC.  (“none” 
noted for issuer’s counsel.  See Offering 
Statement, Part I, Item 1(h), pg. 2) 
 
17. EMERGING GROWTH FUNDING, INC. 
(issuer’s counsel not listed.  See Offering 
Statement, Part I, Item 1(h), pg. 3) 
 
22. THE CARLYLE ULTRA, INC. (issuer’s 
counsel listed as “n/a.”  See Offering 
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Statement, Part I, Item 1(h), pg. 3) 
 
24. HOME DECORATION, INC. (offering 
statement handwritten; issuer’s counsel listed 
as “n/a.”   See Offering Statement, Part I, Item 
1(h), pg. 2) 
 
25. GILPIN COMPUTER CONSULTANTS, 
INC. (issuer’s counsel listed as “none.”  See 
Offering Statement, Part I, Item 1(h), pg. 2) 
 
27. AFRO DOLLAR INC. (offering statement 
handwritten; “none” listed next to issuer’s 
counsel.  See Offering Statement, Part I, Item 
1(h), pg. 3) 
 
42. ALAMO PARTNERS, LLC (“none” noted 
under issuer’s counsel.  See Offering 
Statement, Part I, Item 1(c), pg. 2) 
 
6. 
 
Clear intention  
of doing public  
solicitation 
 
 
1. EQUITYPOINT, LLC (See “Plan of 
Distribution,” pg. 23 – Plan to offer 200,000 
preferred units to the public) 
 
4. THE GODSPELL LLC (securities being 
offered to residents of New York, California, 
Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Michigan.  Managing members 
will be offering securities through solicitation, 
word of mouth, and the internet.  See Offering 
Statement, Part I, Item 4, pg. 3) 
 
19. CARDIOMEDICS, INC. (company states 
explicitly that it is offering its shares to the 
public at a price of $1.00 per share.  See “The 
Offering & Plan of Distribution.  Offering 
Statement, Part I, pg. 13) 
 
21. EL CHUPACABRA, INC. (shares being 
offered through Internet to residents of 
California, New York, and Pennsylvania.  See 
Offering Statement, Part I, ITEM 4, pg. ii) 
ARTICLE 2 (NEWMAN) (DO NOT DELETE) 12/31/15  1:25 PM 
116 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:1 
 
 
 
22. THE CARLYLE ULTRA, INC. (securities 
being sold through nationally registered and 
sanctioned brokerages and may eventually be 
listed through other public mediums.  See 
Offering Statement, Part I, ITEM 4, pp. 3-4) 
 
23. EQUITYPOINT, LLC FUND I SERIES 
(securities being offered to residents of 
Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Delaware.  Managers plan on advertising 
using billboard, radio and television, 
advertisements, and newspapers.  Offering 
Statement, Part I Item 4 – pg. 2) 
 
25. GILPIN COMPUTER CONSULTANTS, 
INC. (shares being offered to all 50 U.S. 
states.  See Offering Statement, Part I – Item 
4, pg. 2) 
 
27. AFRO DOLLAR INC. (shares being offered 
to residents of  Illinois, Alabama, California, 
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, 
Wisconsin, Washington D.C.  See Part II – 
Offering Circular, pg. 13) 
 
31. ENTERTAIMENT ARTS RESEARCH 
INC. (Distribution plan includes sales on 
public markets and exchanges. pg. 25) 
 
7. 
 
Filings that were  
actively seeking 
investors regardless 
of income, net 
worth, or financial 
sophistication 
 
 
10. REAL SPORTS INVESTMENT LLC  
(Company specifically targeting sports fans 
due to the fact they (sports fans) will have the 
most knowledge and interest in a security 
encompassing RSI’s business model.  See 
Offering Statement, Part II Offering Circular, 
“BUSINESS AND PROPERTIES” section) 
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 18. FREEDOM MOTORS, INC. (Company has 
no minimum investment amount and its shares 
were being offered at $2.50 per share.  See 
“Plan of Distribution” section in Part II – 
Offering Circular, pg. 13) 
 
19. CARDIOMEDICS, INC.  (Shares being 
offered for $1.00 per share with no minimum 
investment amount.  See Offering Statement, 
pg. 13) 
 
